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In the context of national critical infrastructure security and resilience doctrine 
and deference to our federalist system and the sovereignty it demands, each of 
the sovereign states and their subdivisions have unilaterally interpreted their 
roles and priorities while still remaining true to the law of the land and national 
supremacy as demanded by the supremacy clause in Article VI of the United 
States Constitution. Each has independently structured, developed, and 
resourced its own critical infrastructure security and resilience program.   
Due to this subjective and evolving nature of the critical infrastructure 
security and resilience mission nationally, a qualitative research method was best 
suited and used for the foundational nature of this work. A formative program 
evaluation was conducted through an anonymous online survey to capture the 
perceptions and views of critical infrastructure professionals across the nation. 
The survey included an evaluation on the perceptions and views of the business 
process, program maturity and implementation, as well as the current state of 
outcomes.  
This thesis concludes with several key findings and recommendations 
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The superior man, when resting in safety, does not forget that danger may come. 
When in a state of security, he does not forget the possibility of ruin. 
When all is orderly, he does not forget that disorder may come. 
Thus his person is not endangered, and his states and all their clans are preserved. 
—Confucius (551 BC–479 BC) 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In accordance with the federalist system on which our government is 
predicated, Presidential Policy Directive 21 and the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (NIPP),1  as published by the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security with stakeholder input, outlines very specific federal leads, and federal 
critical infrastructure protection (security and resilience) related responsibilities 
within the federal government that serve as federal cornerstones. However, as 
should be expected, these documents describe much broader, vaguer, and softer 
roles and responsibilities to be prescribed to state and local governments. With 
due deference to our federalist system and the sovereignty it demands, this lack 
of clarity rightfully allows each of our sovereign states and their subdivisions to 
unilaterally interpret their roles and priorities while still remaining true to the law 
of the land and federal supremacy as demanded by the supremacy clause in 
Article VI of the United States Constitution. Even though each generation of 
published national doctrine does bring more clarity to the specific roles and 
responsibilities of each level of government,2 there is no common template or 
architecture on which any one or all of the several states’ approaches to critical 
infrastructure protection (security and resilience) and their engagement strategies 
																																																								
1 White House, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21: Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience (Washington, DC: White House, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil, 11; U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, NIPP 2013: Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2013), http://www.dhs.gov/
publication/nipp-2013-partnering-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience.   
2 Pamela N. Broughton, “Measuring Preparedness: Assessing the Impact of the Homeland 
Security Grant Program” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), 30.  
2 
with private and public sector partners can be modeled. Therefore, as would be 
expected, each of the sovereign states and their subdivisions have independently 
structured, developed, and resourced their own programs, which has led to 
inconsistent critical infrastructure protection program development and 
implementation among the states. 
Furthermore, in addition to having uneven expectations and 
responsibilities, most state and local jurisdictions appear to have uneven 
resources dedicated to the critical infrastructure protection mission.3 This thesis 
explores the local adaption that has occurred4 and the current state of the critical 
infrastructure community and its mission. This exploration will enhance our 
collective understanding as to whether the current approach and resources are 
adequate to meet the mandates, expectations, and assertions made on the 
critical infrastructure protection (security and resilience) community. Additionally, 
this thesis examines the current state of the “integrated network” of critical 
infrastructure protection partners and the “collective expertise” that former U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff describes in the 2009 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).5 
The foundational nature of this work provides insight into whether our 
federalist system, perhaps coupled with profit motivated private critical 
infrastructure owners and operators, is creating an environment that allows a 
strategic tragedy of the commons (TOC)6 at a national level to develop within the 
critical infrastructure community. This is important to recognize because if 
national TOC is unmitigated, it could eventually lead to the degradation, 
																																																								
3 Curtis Parsons, and Brian Wright, Summary of Regional Reports: Critical Infrastructure 
Programs 2011–2013 (Washington, DC: United States Department of Homeland Security: State, 
Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council).  
4 Raphael Sagarin, “Natural Security for a Variable and Risk-Filled World,” Homeland 
Security Affairs 6, no. 3 (September 2010): 8, https://www.hsaj.org/articles/79.  
5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Partnering 
to Enhance Protection and Resiliency (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009), i.  
6 Ted G. Lewis, Bak’s Sand Pile: Strategies for a Catastrophic World (Williams, CA: Agile 
Press, 2011), 16–22.  
3 
dysfunction, or collapse of our protection framework. In this case, in the context 
of a weak protection mission space, it is postulated that business decisions 
shaped by profit or fiscal efficiencies could lead to self-organized criticality 
(SOC)7 within and among the established critical infrastructure sectors. In this 
context, SOC can be described as too much ownership of the protection mission 
space of an asset or process by a single entity and TOC can be described as too 
little ownership by any one entity. 
Similar to a “catastrophic” event, where the term “catastrophic” can have a 
sliding definition based on the impact acuity on a defined jurisdiction, so too does 
“critical” have a sliding definition that shapes our understanding of what should 
be deemed “critical” from a national, state, or local perspective. As a nation, it is 
in our interests to better understand whether current expectations and 
understandings of the critical infrastructure community are aligned with the reality 
of critical infrastructure organizations nationally. This thesis establishes a ground 
truth of the current state of state and local critical infrastructure organizations and 
the national community in the United States. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
It is obvious that at any level, we simply cannot afford to protect everything 
that may be vulnerable. Therefore, a discussion of “criticality” is essential. 
Question 1 asks for the status of resources available for this mission, and 
Question 2 asks how well our obligations are defined and how well those 
obligations are met. Determining how we define what is critical will allow us to 
“draw a line” and distinguish between essential infrastructure components and 
those that we may like to protect but that are less essential. It allows us to 






(1) Primary Questions 
 How is the critical infrastructure community at the state and local 
government level currently resourced to fulfill its critical 
infrastructure protection (security and resilience) mission? 
 How is the federal and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) 
protection (security and resilience) mission space framed by the 
federal approach and support to this mission space?  
(2) Secondary Questions 
 Are the state and local critical infrastructure resources currently 
dedicated to the mission adequate to fulfill the defined critical 
infrastructure protection (security and resilience) mission?  
 What recommendations and/or refinements can be made to allow 
state and local government the opportunity to more effectively and 
efficiently execute the critical infrastructure protection (security and 
resilience) mission?    
 
5 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review is not intended to be an all-inclusive, comprehensive 
compilation, or exhaustive analysis of the literature associated with critical 
infrastructure protection, security or resilience—it cannot be. The volume of work 
prohibits it. Rather, it is intended to frame the landscape and contours of the 
existing body of associated work. It appears that most literature specific to critical 
infrastructure falls under one of two prevailing categories—technical literature 
and programmatic literature. 
There are volumes of technical literature on critical infrastructure in the 
United States. This scientific literature tends to be scholarly and tends to center 
around the technical performance and operation of assets and asset 
subcomponents as well as technical methodologies for analysis and assessment 
of infrastructures. The programmatic literature generally appears in the form of 
public doctrine, which generally outlines national concepts, expectations, goals 
as well as some tools and methods. Most of this identified literature falls within 
three subcategories: industry associations, academic science, and government 
doctrine and white papers or reports. Most of the academic writing appears to be 
concentrated on the scientific efforts to model, harden, and identify dependencies 
and interdependencies within and between sectors of critical infrastructure. Much 
of the industry and professional association literature is focused on the current 
state of different sectors, emerging trends, and scientific thought centered around 
the modeling of critical infrastructure. Much of what is presented is of a scientific 
nature, and seeks to understand the mathematics behind the models. 
Though there is a broad set of public doctrine and associated expectations 
and mandates for critical infrastructure professionals across the country, there 
appears to be very limited non-scientific scholarly programmatic literature on the 
policy side of critical infrastructure protection (security and resilience). An 
exploration of the Homeland Security Digital Library, the Naval Postgraduate 
School’s Dudley Knox Library, the Library of Congress’s Congressional Research 
6 
Service (CRS), and the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
has identified a finite set of federal government and national doctrine and 
documents such as the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), 8 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7,9 numerous CRS reports and GAO 
reports for analysis. Cornerstone public doctrine that outlines contemporary 
concepts, expectations, assertions, and mandates, includes sources such as the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296), President Bush’s National 
Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets10 
and President Obama’s Presidential Policy Directive / PPD-21: Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience.11  
In his 2003 national strategy, President Bush first set out to define the 
strategic objectives and desired end state of our then new collective national 
mission of physical protection. 12  Framing our current thinking on critical 
infrastructure security and resilience, President Obama issued PPD-21 on 
February 12, 2013. PPD-21 describes the unique role of owners and operators of 
critical infrastructure13 and describes the national policy and endeavor of critical 
infrastructure security and resilience as a “shared responsibility amongst Federal, 
state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) entities and public and private owners and 
operators of critical infrastructure.” 14  The directive further re-defines the 16 
critical infrastructure sectors,15 the roles and responsibilities of federal partners 
																																																								
8 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, NIPP 2013.  
9 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical 
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2003), http://www.dhs.gov/homeland-security-presidential-directive-7. 
10 White House, The National Strategy for The Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures 
and Key Assets (Washington, DC: White House, 2003).  
11 White House, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21.  
12 White House, The National Strategy for The Physical Protection, vii.  
13 White House, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21, 2.  
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid., 15–16. 
7 
and federal sector-specific agencies (SSA), 16  as well as outlines the “three 
strategic imperatives” that drive the federal approach to critical infrastructure 
security and resilience.17  
The president is clear that effective implementation of his directive will 
require a “national unity of effort” that must include the federal sector-specific 
agencies and other federal departments and agencies, as well as a strong 
collaboration and partnership of the federal community with critical infrastructure 
owners and operators and SLTT entities.18 The collaboration and partnership 
imperative, and the president’s call to action of critical infrastructure owners and 
operators as well as SLTT entities are also clear. In the context of state 
sovereignty and national supremacy, the president explicitly identifies the need 
for federal partners to collaborate and partner with critical infrastructure owners 
and operators and SLTT entities throughout his directive. With “SLTT entities” 
referred to at least 12 times in PPD-21, it becomes important to gain an insight or 
to better understand what these SLTT entities are, the imperatives that drive their 
approach, and how the entities are staffed and resourced. This collective insight 
or understanding is an important baseline to establish to further define the 
appropriate and reasonable roles of all critical infrastructure security and 
resilience partners and to determine whether these partners are similarly or 
proportionately postured and equipped to achieve the necessary national unity of 
effort. 
In 2009, the National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) found the 
need for clarified roles and responsibilities of critical infrastructure partners.19 
Established by President Bush’s Executive Order 13231, the NIAC was created 
to provide the president and federal departments and agencies non-federal 
																																																								
16 Ibid., 4–8, 15–16. 
17 Ibid., 3–4, 9–11. 
18 Ibid., 4. 
19 National Infrastructure Advisory Council, Critical Infrastructure Resilience: Final Report 
and Recommendations (Washington, DC: National Infrastructure Advisory Council, 2009), 19, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/niac/niac_critical_infrastructure_resilience.pdf.  
8 
executive level advise on critical infrastructure sectors through the secretary of 
the Department of Homeland Security.20 21 The NIAC has met regularly since its 
creation on October 16, 2001. In addition, since 2004, it has conducted a wide 
range of critical infrastructure related studies and has published associated study 
reports and recommendations.  
The council’s final report and recommendations on critical infrastructure 
resilience was published on September 8, 2009. This report was conducted in 
three phases that centered on developing a working definition of resilience, 
cataloging the current government and business efforts of the day to promoted 
resilience, and the development of actionable recommendations that were 
associated with the six findings outlined in the report. 22  Of note, the word 
“government” is used throughout the report with no distinction of jurisdiction or 
level of government. This could be purposely reflective of the inclusive nature of 
NIAC’s work, indicative of the collaborative nature of the public sector critical 
infrastructure enterprise, or perhaps reinforce the implicit need for further 
definition and role clarity within the enterprise. By design, the NIAC’s advise to 
the president and federal community represents the perspective of private sector 
executives; therefore, the use of the broad word “government” could also be a 
simple matter of convenience not unlike the wide use of “public sector” or “private 
sector.”  
A series of regional reports and an associated summary document 
published by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security State, Local, Tribal and 
Territorial Government Coordinating Council (SLTTGCC), 23  which begins to 
explore SLTT critical infrastructure security and resilience organizations and 
programs, appears to be the most recent programmatic literature available as 
																																																								
20 Exec. Order No. 13231 (2001), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/executive-order-13231-
dated-2001-10-16-initial.pdf.  
21 National Infrastructure Advisory Council, Critical Infrastructure Resilience, 4.  
22 Ibid., 7, 16–27. 
23 Parsons, and Wright, Summary of Regional Report, 1–22.  
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secondary data to shape and inform the work of this thesis and our national 
thinking. 
As legally established in 2007 and further defined by the 2009 National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP),24 the SLTTGCC is comprised of national 
critical infrastructure protection leaders and partners from across the United 
States. In an effort to better understand its own community and constituents, the 
SLTTGCC commissioned a review and analysis of state and local partners by 
associated federal regions and published 10 regional reports and a summary roll-
up document that outlines existing and emerging organizational and 
programmatic themes. 25  This SLTTGCC study was based on 284 direct 
interviews of critical infrastructure partners and practitioners that focused on 
SLTT program structure, activities, and needs across all 10 federal regions.26 It 
concluded, in part, that despite being focused on the same common elements of 
critical infrastructure security and resilience as outlined in the NIPP,27 no two 
programs across the nation were organized, staffed, and resourced similarly.28 
Furthermore, the final report summarized 39 findings that included general 
themes by federal region, critical infrastructure program fundamentals, best 
practices, and top needs of the SLTT critical infrastructure community.29 
Driven in part by the resilience requirements of PPD-2130 and similar in 
nature to the 2009 NIAC critical infrastructure resilience report, another facet of 
																																																								
24 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 2. 
25 Parsons, and Wright, Summary of Regional Report, 1–22.  
26 Ibid., 2–4.  
27 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, NIPP 2013, 15.  
28 Parsons, and Wright, Summary of Regional Report, 4.  
29 Ibid., 2–4. 
30 F. D. Petit et al., Resilience Measurement Index: An Indicator of Critical Infrastructure 
Resilience (Argonne, IL: Argonne National Laboratory: Decision and Information Sciences 
Division, 2013), ix, http://www.ipd.anl.gov/anlpubs/2013/07/76797.pdf; Penny Pritzker, 
“Community Resilience Planning Guide for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems: Volume II—




related literature that appears to be an emerging subcategory of both the 
technical and programmatic critical infrastructure literature is focused on 
resilience. This emerging subcategory of resilience literature appears to center 
around how resilience is or can be defined, measured, and/or achieved. Much of 
this emerging subcategory of literature is blended government reports or papers 
that contain or catalog both technical and programmatic issues of resilience. 
Amplifying the definition of resilience provided in PPD-21,31 this literature tends 
to describe the common core resilience elements in terms of absorption, 
adaptation, and recovery, as well as additional companion, derivative, or variant 
elements of each. 32 Examples of these blended technical and program 
documents include the comprehensive National Academy of Sciences report 
Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative.33 Open meetings and field visits to 
collect data in the Gulf of Mexico coast states of Louisiana and Mississippi, as 
well as in Iowa and southern California, serve as the backdrop to the study.34 
The study report outlines resilience in terms of understanding and managing risk, 
resilience leadership and investments, metrics and measurement of progress, 
local engagement, and capacity, policy, and the way forward.35  
Since August 2010, the U.S. Department of Energy’s Argonne National 
Laboratory (ANL) has published three reports on the specific topic of resilience. It 
appears that the first and third reports of this series were primarily written to 
																																																								
31 White House, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21, 17.  
32 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, NIPP 2013, 7; L. Carlson et al., Resilience: 
Theory and Applications (Argonne, IL: Argonne National Laboratory: Decision and Information 
Sciences Division, 2012), vii, 21–22, http://www.ipd.anl.gov/anlpubs/2012/02/72218.pdf.  
33 Committee on Increasing National Resilience to Hazards and Disasters, Disaster 
Resilience: A National Imperative (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2012), 
http://resilience.abag.ca.gov/wp-content/documents/resilience/toolkit/
Disaster%20Resilience_A%20National%20Imperative.pdf.  
34 Ibid., viii.  
35 Committee on Increasing National Resilience to Hazards and Disasters, Disaster 
Resilience, xv–xvi, 1–9. 
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outline the development of a resilience measurement index (RMI). 36  These 
publications outlined the thinking, function and utilization of the RMI to support 
the DHS Office of Infrastructure Protection’s Infrastructure Survey Tool (IST) and 
protective security advisors (PSA) conducting site assistance visits (SAV).37 The 
first report was more foundational in nature and conceptually outlined the RMI 
pre-cursor, the proposed ANL resilience index (RI).38 The third report outlined the 
evolved and matured thinking of the RMI and how the RMI compliments the two 
ANL companion indices: the Protective Measures Index (PMI) and the 
Consequences Measurement Index (CMI).39 
The second in the ANL resilience report series, Resiliency: Theory and 
Applications is less technical in nature and provides more of a policy narrative on 
the evolving contours of the RMI and of measuring and evaluating community 
and regional resilience.40 The report goes on to describe critical infrastructure as 
one community or regional subsystem among several subsystems important to 
achieving overall resilience. In addition to the critical infrastructure subsystem, 
ANL suggests that the other threads in the community and regional resilience 
fabric include the economic, civil society, supply chain/dependencies and 
governance/institutional subsystems.41 Released during the writing of this thesis, 
the U.S. Department of Commerce National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) recently published a rich and blended draft volume set titled 
Community Resilience Planning Guide for Buildings and Infrastructure 
																																																								
36 Petit et al., Resilience Measurement Index; R. E. Fisher et al., Constructing a Resilience 
Index for the Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection Program (Argonne, IL: Argonne National 
Laboratory: Decision and Information Sciences Division, August 2010), http://www.ipd.anl.gov/
anlpubs/2010/09/67823.pdf.  
37 Fisher et al., Constructing a Resilience Index, ix–1, 14–16, 19–22.  
38 Ibid., 1–7, 21–27.  
39 Petit et al., Resilience Measurement Index, x–2, 4–5, 15–16, 23–26, 29.  
40 Carlson et al., Resilience: Theory and Applications.  
41 Ibid., 19–29. 
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Systems.42 Rather than simply outlining the issues, justifications, or aspirational 
goals to achieve community resilience—the “whats” and “whys” of resilience—the 
draft NIST volumes attempt to put forth a blueprint to assist communities on 
“how” to operationally achieve it. 
From the practical to the abstract, several books have also been recently 
published on the different aspects of resilience. For instance, Dane Egli 
published his book Beyond the Storms during the writing of this thesis. Egli’s 
book is a mostly practical catalog that amplifies the numerous evolving issues 
and themes associated with the contemporary discussion on achieving 
resilience. Additionally, he outlines the conceptual roots of resiliency and 
explains that the deeper the resiliency roots of infrastructure, the more likely 
infrastructure is too stand-up to all-hazard stressors.43 Half of Egli’s volume is a 
compilation of 13 case studies that he uses to illustrate his recommendations and 
priorities necessary to achieve resilience. Another source published in 2012, is 
Andrew Zolli’s book Resilience, which is more of an abstract writing about 
resilience and the dynamics of the larger human experience. 44  Beyond the 
resilience elements of absorption, adaptation, and recovery, Zolli explores the 
individual and collective characteristics of people and the systems on which we 
are dependent. Throughout the book, Zolli illustrates his ideas with stories and 
anecdotes along with historical and contemporary real-world examples about the 
notion of robust yet fragile (RYF), scale, swarms clusters, cooperation, cognitive 
diversity, and leadership.45 
																																																								
42 Pritzker, “Community Resilience Planning Guide, Vol II;” Penny Pritzker, “Community 
Resilience Planning Guide for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems: Volume I—Draft for Public 
Comment” (Washington, DC: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2015), 
http://www.nist.gov/el/building_materials/resilience/upload/NIST_Guide_Volume_1_042515_For-
Web-2.pdf.  
43 Dane S. Egli, Beyond the Storms: Strengthening Homeland Security and Disaster 
Management to Achieve Resilience, 1st ed. (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2014), 30. 
44 Andrew Zolli, Resilience: Why Things Bounce Back, 1st ed. (New York: Free Press, 2012). 
45 Ibid., 27–28, 40, 49, 61, 65, 68–71, 93, 156–159, 210, 239. 
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The Commonwealth of Australia has also published noteworthy 
government doctrine and reports. The United States and Australia both maintain 
a federalist form of government. Comprised of 10 states and territories, the 
commonwealth is roughly equivalent (yet slightly smaller) in geographic size to 
the contiguous 48 states of the United States.46 It has a current approximate 
population that is roughly equal to the combined population of the states of New 
York and Kansas (approximately 22.4 million people)47; the Australian population 
is approximately 22.6 million people. 48  Given this, neither the Australian 
population density nor the concentration of infrastructure is close to that of the 
United States. However, the similarities in geographic size, the federalist form of 
government, and the critical infrastructure practices employed by the Australian 
government makes for an interesting comparative example. 
It is clear in current Australian doctrine that national security is national 
security with no distinction to be made about the Australian homeland—
homeland security in Australia is inherently national security (unlike in the U.S. 
where there is some enterprise overlap and some separation). The broader and 
inter-connected context of the national security environment in Australia includes 
both traditional and “non-traditional threats such as organized crime, natural 
disasters and pandemics.” 49  In 2009 and similar to what President Obama 
outlined and directed in PPD-21, Australia formally shifted the thinking of its 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Program to Critical Infrastructure Resilience—a 
subtle yet profound shift in focus. The commonwealth anchored this shift in 
thinking with the publication of the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy and 
																																																								
46 Central Intelligence Agency, “Australia,” The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/as.html.  
47 U.S. Census Bureau, “State and County Quick Facts” [New York, Kansas], 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36000.html. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Commonwealth of Australia, Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy, 2010, 
http://www.ag.gov.au/Nationalsecurityandcounterterrorism/Pages/
CriticalInfrastructureResilience.aspx, 6.  
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the Strategy Supplement: An Overview of Activities to Deliver the Strategy.50 
Built on its traditional critical infrastructure protection efforts, the Australian critical 
infrastructure resilience (CIR) strategy is a whole-of-nation, all-hazards approach, 
which at the commonwealth level of government, is directly managed by the 
Attorney-General’s Department. The new CIR program maintains the “protection” 
aspect of critical infrastructure as one element of the overall resiliency mission. 
Similar to the United States, but perhaps a bit tighter in scope, the Australian 
government recognizes critical infrastructure as that which underpins all other 
essential services; these underpinnings include power, water, health, 
communications systems, and banking.51 In the United States, these named 
sectors are equal in importance, and they are thought to be the lifeline52 critical 
infrastructure sectors of the now 16 critical infrastructure sectors outlined in the 
2013 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).53  As is the case in the 
United States’ security and resilience mission, engagement with the private 
sector owners and operators is the centerpiece to the current Australian CIR 
strategy.54 
																																																								
50 Commonwealth of Australia, Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy Supplement: An 
Overview of Activities to Deliver the Strategy, 2010, http://www.emergency.qld.gov.au/
publications/pdf/Critical_Infrastructure_Resilience_Strategy_Supplement.pdf.  
51 Ibid., 3.  
52 Constance H. Lau, and Beverly Scott, “Strengthening Regional Resilience through 
National, Regional and Sector Partnerships—DRAFT Report and Recommendations” 
(Washington, DC: National Infrastructure Advisory Council, 2013), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/niac-rrwg-report-final-review-draft-for-qbm.pdf; Brandon J. Hardenbrook, 
“The Need for a Policy Framework to Develop Disaster Resilient Regions,” Journal of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management 2, no. 3 (2005), doi:10.2202/1547-7355.1133.  
53 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, NIPP 2013, 11.  
54 Commonwealth of Australia, Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy, 12–13.  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
Due to the subjective and evolving nature of the critical infrastructure 
security and resilience mission nationally, a qualitative research method was best 
suited and used for the foundational nature of this work. A formative program 
evaluation was conducted through a national online anonymous survey to 
capture the views of critical infrastructure professionals. The survey included an 
evaluation on the perceptions of the business process, maturity and 
implementation, and current state of outcomes. 
This formative research centered on an online national survey of critical 
infrastructure protection professionals conducted through the approved Naval 
Postgraduate School’s enterprise survey tool, Lime Survey. The survey was 
completely anonymous and voluntary in nature, and no personally identifiable 
information, Internet Protocol (IP) address, or other electronic signature was 
captured during this survey.  
The survey was open for respondent participation from Tuesday, June 17, 
2014 to Thursday, July 31, 2014—approximately seven full weeks. During the 
open participation period, there were a total of 135 hits on the internet survey link 
recorded. The system recognized 15 people that navigated away from the survey 
link before starting the survey. A total of 120 respondents fully or partially 
participated. Of the 120 total respondents, 84 people completed the entire 
survey, and 36 people partially completed the survey.  
The online survey consisted of 48 questions structured into four sections, 
which included basic information about the respondent’s background and 
affiliation (role in the critical infrastructure enterprise), perceptions on strategic 
business process maturity and implementation, views on operational business 
process maturity, and implementation as well as perceptions on the current state 
of the critical infrastructure enterprise and current outcomes. 
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Participants were asked to rate their perceptions by utilizing a Likert55 
scale of strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, disagree, agree, somewhat 
agree, or strongly agree. The Lime Survey tool captured the number of 
respondents for each question and the rating provided. This data was then 
utilized to calculate averages and composite percentages.  
A. AVERAGE RESPONDENT SCORE 
To evaluate the response averages; each Likert 56  rating scale was 
converted to a numeric value. For those perception-based questions that 
included an “I don’t know” response option, the “I don’t know” answer was 
assigned a “99” value as a numeric flag and dropped from the average equation. 
No further evaluation or action was taken with these “99” values. Numeric values 
were assigned as follows: 
Strongly disagree  = 1 
Somewhat disagree = 2 
Disagree   = 3 
Agree   = 4 
Somewhat agree  = 5 
Strongly agree  = 6 
I don’t know  = 99 
Never    = 1 
Almost never  = 2 
Infrequently  = 3 
Occasionally  = 4 
Frequently   = 5 
 
																																																								
55 John M. Linacre, “Investigating Rating Scale Category Utility,” Journal of Outcome 
Measurement: Dedicated to Health, Education and Social Science 3, no. 2 (1999): 104–106; 
Janice Rattray, and Martyn C Jones, “Issues in Clinical Nursing: Essential Elements of 
Questionnaire Design and Development,” Journal of Clinical Nursing 16 (2005): 235–236, 
doi:10.1111/j.1365-2702.2006.01573.x.  
56 Linacre, “Investigating Rating Scale Category Utility,” 104–106; Rattray, and Jones, 
“Issues in Clinical Nursing,” 235–236. 
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Very frequently  = 6 
I don’t know  = 99 
For Question 8, where respondents were asked to choose one answer 
that best described their jurisdiction, the following nominal numeric values were 
assigned:  
Rural    = 1 
Rural-suburban  = 2 
Suburban   = 3 
Suburban-urban  = 4 
Urban    = 5 
The average numeric response value was calculated by summing all of the 
assigned 1–6 (or 1–5) numeric values for each question and dividing that sum by 
the total number of respondents (N) for each question.  
Average respondent score = sum of assigned numeric values 
         total number of responses (N) 
This provides an average respondent response score that serves as a 
benchmark of collective respondent sentiment for each perception-based 
question. For the Likert57 scale-based questions, an average respondent score 
between 1 and 3 is an expression of disagreement. An average respondent 
score between 4 and 6 is an expression of agreement. For the nominal numeric 
values assigned in Question 8, the average respondent score is not an 
expression of respondent sentiment but is objectively reflective of the average 
type of jurisdiction respondents indicated. 
B. COMPOSITE PERCENTAGES 
The Microsoft Excel calculation and graphing tool was utilized to 
determine and depict composite percentages for each of the perception-based 
questions presented. In addition, graphs were generated to present the 
sentiment of those within each response option of each question. Each graph 
																																																								
57 Ibid.  
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generated by the Microsoft Excel graphing tool provides a view of the 
proportional composition of respondents. 
C. ANALYSIS 
Results were examined and analyzed based on respondents’ answers to 
each question, cross-analyzed by some of the background and affiliation data 
that was captured. This allowed for additional context, more insightful response 
analysis and the identification of trends or anomalies. A Microsoft Excel analytical 




IV. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SURVEY 
This section will present the survey response data analysis for each block 
of the online survey. Where specific questions are cited, the average respondent 
score (Average) and the total number of respondents to the question (N) are 
provided (i.e., Question xx: Average y.yy, N=zz).  
A. POTENTIAL BIAS 
During the approximate seven full weeks that the survey was open for 
respondent participation to solicit anonymous online participation in the survey, 
the survey recruitment script with an embedded survey hyperlink was distributed 
via three primary channels. The survey recruitment was distributed twice through 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Infrastructure Protection State, Local, 
Tribal and Territorial Government Coordinating Council (SLTTGCC), twice 
through the national Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) conference email 
distribution list, and once by the National Governors Association (NGA) 
Governors’ Homeland Security Advisors Council (GHSAC). These distribution 
channels could potentially weigh the opinion data of respondents from urban 
jurisdictions, state level professionals or those individuals with a vested interest 
in expanding their professional role or organization. 
B. SURVEY SECTION: BACKGROUND AND AFFILIATION 
A series of seven background and affiliation questions were asked of 
respondents. The responses from these questions were cross-analyzed against 
the perceptual responses for additional context and more insightful response 
analysis. Question 1 was the only mandatory question in the survey conducted. 
All respondents had to provide informed consent (by selecting “I consent to 
participate in this study”) to start the survey. If a respondent navigated away from 
the online survey hyperlink or selected “I do not consent to participate in this 
study,” the survey session ended. Figure 1 indicates that 91 respondents 
provided consent to participate in this study. 
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Figure 1.  Consent to participate in this study. 
In Question 2 (N=90), respondents were asked to self-identify as either a 
critical infrastructure protection (CIP) practitioner within their jurisdiction or as a 
member of a partner organization to their jurisdiction’s CIP practitioners. This 
question was asked to better understand a respondent’s perspective with which 
she or he was completing the study. As indicated in Figure 2, 61 respondents 
(67.77 percent) self-identified as a CIP practitioner, 29 respondents (32.22 
percent) self-identified as a member of a partner organization, and one 
respondent did not self-identify. 
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Figure 2.  Self-identification as a CIP practitioner or partner. 
Question 3 (N=90) asked respondents to provide their state/territory of 
jurisdiction or the state/territory within which their primary jurisdiction exists. As 
shown in Figure 3, responses were then aligned to the 10 FEMA regions for 
analytical purposes to understand what, if an, geographic distinctions exist. 
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Figure 3.  State/territory alignment to the 10 federal FEMA regions. 
Question 4 (N=91) was asked to determine the type of organization with 
which respondents identified by selecting the choice that best described their 
organization. The survey provided 11 different options. An “other” option was 
also provided within which a narrative response could be provided if a 
respondent did not consider the provided choices appropriate or accurate. This 
response data is important to understand respondents’ perspective when cross-
analyzed against perceptual response data. As indicated in Figure 4, the top five 
best organizational descriptions included 32 respondents (35.16 percent) who 
selected “emergency management,” 16 respondents (17.58 percent) selected 
“law enforcement,” 15 respondents (16.48 percent) selected “homeland security,” 
11 respondents (12.08 percent) selected “other,” and eight respondents (8.79 
percent) critical infrastructure protection (CIP).” 
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Figure 4.  Best description of respondents’ organization. 
Question 5 (N=91) asked respondents to determine the organizational role 
with which they identified by selecting the choice that best described their title or 
position. The survey provided seven different options, and an “other” option was 
also provided within which a narrative response could be provided if a 
respondent did not consider the provided choices appropriate or accurate. This 
response data is important to understand respondents’ organizational 
perspective and provide additional context when cross-analyzed against 
perceptual response data. As indicated in Figure 5, the top five best descriptions 
of respondents’ roles within their organization included 29 respondents (31.86 
percent) who selected “program manager,” 20 respondents (21.97 percent) 
selected “other,” 15 respondents (16.48 percent) selected “director/deputy 
director,” 13 respondents (14.28 percent) selected “manager/bureau chief,” and 
nine respondents (9.89 percent) selected “supervisor/ team leader.” 
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Figure 5.  Best description of a respondents’ role within their 
organization. 
Question 6 (N=90) was asked to determine respondents’ years of 
experience as a CIP practitioner or member of a partner organization. 
Experience level is an important analytical element to better how perceptions 
may change with a respondents’ level of experience. As indicated in Figure 6, 
most respondents (70.00 percent) indicated between one and 10 years of 
experience as a CIP practitioner or CIP partner, 32 respondents (35.55 percent) 
selecting “1–5 years” of experience, 31 respondents (34.44 percent) selecting 
“6–10 years” of experience, and 16 respondents (17.77 percent) selecting 11–15 
years of experience. The average experience of all respondents was 9.07 years.  
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Figure 6.  Years of experience as a CIP practitioner or CIP partner. 
Question 7 (N=91) was asked to establish the respondents’ level of 
government by selecting the choice that best described their jurisdiction. The 
survey provided six different options. An “other” option was also provided within 
which a narrative response could be provided if a respondent did not consider 
the provided choices reflective of their jurisdiction. This response data is 
important to understand respondents’ jurisdictional perspective and provide 
additional context when cross-analyzed against perceptual response data. As 
indicated in Figure 7, the top three best descriptions of respondents’ jurisdictions 
included 30 respondents (32.96 percent) who selected “state,” 27 respondents 




Figure 7.  Respondents’ jurisdiction. 
Question 8 (N=87) asked respondents to qualify their jurisdiction as rural, 
rural-suburban, suburban, suburban-urban, or urban. This response data is 
important to further understand respondents’ jurisdictional perspective and 
provide additional context when cross-analyzed against perceptual response 
data. Based on respondent data, Figure 8 shows that most respondents 
indicated that their jurisdiction was primarily suburban to suburban-urban 
(Question 8: Average 3.63, N=87).  
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Figure 8.  Respondents’ jurisdiction qualified rural to urban. 
C. SURVEY SECTION: PERCEPTIONS AND VIEWS OF STRATEGIC AND 
TACTICAL BUSINESS PROCESS 
The next block of questions centered on the respondents’ general 
perceptions and views of the strategic and tactical aspects of the critical 
infrastructure protection (security and resilience) enterprise. Many respondents 
indicated that their jurisdictions have invested their own operational funds to 
support staffing of their critical infrastructure protection program (37.5 percent of 
salary is supported by operational budgets, see Figure 9). As further indicated in 
Figure 9, it also appears that the financial investments in CIP staff are 
significantly dependent on federal grant funds (55.8 percent of salary is 
supported by federal financial grants, see Figure 9). Respondents indicated the 
use of federal financial grants to support CIP staff salaries as follows: the FEMA 
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) is 19.5 percent of financial support, 
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) is 17.8 percent of financial support, and the 
FEMA Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) is 11.8 percent of 
28 
the financial support of CIP staff salaries (see Figure 10). Though respondents 
indicated the use of other funding sources, such as private sector financial 
support, state grants and federal grant programs, including the Port Security 
Grant Program (PSGP), the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP), and 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) funding to support their CIP program salaries, 
the three most common types of federal grant funds invested were the HSGP, 
UASI and EMPG. Of note, the utilization percentages of the funding sources 
indicated (Figures 9–11) do not change significantly when filtered by 80 percent 
plus utilization of a single funding source indicating a dependence on these 
federal funding mechanisms. 
 
Figure 9.  Funding source of CIP staff salaries. 
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Figure 10.  Funding source of CIP staff salaries with federal subset. 
 
Figure 11.  Funding source of CIP staff salaries with federal subset of at 
least 80 percent of funding coming from a single source. 
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The utilization of federal grant funds increases when cross-analyzed 
against CIP staff members where staff members are not fully dedicated to CIP 
program responsibilities. Figure 12 indicates a 65.6 percent utilization of federal 
financial grants in this instance. The high use of federal grant funds to support 
staff members not fully dedicated to CIP responsibilities may further indicate both 
a critical dependence on these federal funds and inherent programmatic 
vulnerability.  
 
Figure 12.  Funding source of CIP staff (collateral responsibilities) salaries 
with federal subset. 
If these federal grant program dollars are jeopardized or reduced, it could 
have direct impact on these CIP staffing investments. This vulnerability was 
further reinforced by many respondents in the open narrative question at the end 
of the survey, Table 1 (Question 18, N=52) where respondents were asked to 
provide one thing that could be done in their jurisdiction to improve their CIP 
program. Of the 52 respondents to this question, 11 respondents (21.15 percent) 
specifically cited the need for more and/or dedicated funding. Please see Figure 
23.  
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From a state and local governmental program perspective and based on 
respondents’ survey responses, CIP responsibilities appear to be a collateral 
duty assigned to organizational components not fully dedicated to the CIP 
mission, with minimal programmatic staffing. This was very clearly indicated by 
the survey response data of multiple questions wherein 28 of 47 respondents 
(59.57 percent) indicated one or two fulltime staff members assigned to CIP 
responsibilities. Almost half the respondents to Question 22 (21 of 47 
respondents (44.68 percent)) indicated that where there is fulltime programmatic 
staffing, it appears to be one fulltime staff member (Figures 13 and 14). Seven 
respondents (14.89 percent) indicated two fulltime staff members, and almost a 
quarter of respondents (11 of 47 respondents (23.40 percent)) indicated a range 
of three to seven fulltime staff members maintained. Eight respondents (17.02 
percent) further indicated greater than 10 fulltime staff members assigned to CIP 
responsibilities.  
 
Figure 13.  Respondents’ jurisdiction maintains a CIP organizational 
element fully dedicated to CIP protection mission. 
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Figure 14.  Distribution of full time staff dedicated to the CIP mission. 
Responses did not appear to vary greatly when cross-analyzed against 
CIP practitioner/partner status, jurisdiction type, or qualified jurisdiction. A data 
anomaly was recognized in Figure 15 regarding Region 5, wherein 25 percent of 
respondents indicated they had fulltime staff dedicated to the CIP mission and 
when asked how many staff, Region 5 respondents indicated an average of 7.3 
fulltime staff members. The Region 5 average of 7.3 staff members is well above 
the overall respondent average of 4.9 full time staff (indicated by Figure 16).  
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Figure 15.  Percentage of respondents by federal FEMA region that 
indicated they have fulltime staff and the average number of 
the fulltime staff reported. 
 
Figure 16.  Percentage of respondents that indicated fulltime CIP staff are 
maintained by their organization/jurisdiction and the average 




























































Q 21.  My organiza on / jurisdic on maintains FULL TIME staff dedicated to the CIP 
mission. (N = 85) 

















































Q 21. and Q 22.  Percent of organiza ons/jurisdic ons that maintain FULL TIME 
staff dedicated to the CIP mission and the average number of FULL TIME staff. 
(N = 47) 
% Yes Average # of FULL me staff 
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Regions 4, 6, and 7 were below the overall average, indicating 1.3, 1.4 and 1.0 
fulltime staff respectively. Region 2 appears to have the most dedicated fulltime 
staff as indicated by 86 percent of Region 2 respondents and is also well above 
the average number of fulltime staff maintained with an average Region 2 report 
of 11.5 staff members. Respondents indicated that their organization or 
jurisdiction also maintained an average of 4.3 part-time staff members dedicated 
to the CIP mission (see Figure 17). Regions 1, 4, and 5 had the greatest number 
of jurisdictions that maintain part-time staff, and Regions 1, 4, and 9 had the 
greatest numbers of part-time staff members assigned within the jurisdictions in 
each region. Of note, as Figure 18 indicates, Regions 3, 6, 7, and 8 reported no 
part-time staff member assignments. Though 87.50	percent of respondents 
indicated five or less part-time staff assigned in their jurisdiction, two outlier data 
points were present: two respondents indicated 10 part-time staff, and one 
respondent indicated 25+ part-time staff members assigned (Figure 19).  
 
Figure 17.  Percentage of respondents that indicated part time CIP staff 
are maintained by their organization/jurisdiction and the 

















































Q 23. and Q 24.  Percent of organiza ons/jurisdic ons that maintain PART TIME 
staff dedicated to the CIP mission and the average number of PART TIME staff. 
(N = 24) 
% Yes Average # of PART me staff 
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Figure 18.  Percentage of respondents by federal FEMA region that 
indicated they have part-time staff and the average number of 
the part-time staff reported. 
 
Figure 19.  Distribution of part time staff dedicated to the CIP mission.  
As indicated by Figure 20, respondents generally disagreed when asked if 




























































Q 23.  My organiza on / jurisdic on maintains PART TIME staff dedicated to the CIP 
mission. (N = 85) 
% Yes Average # of PART me staff 
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entirely dedicated to CIP as its core mission; 53 of 85 respondents (62.35 
percent) expressed negative sentiment, and 31 of 85 respondents (36.47 
percent) expressed positive sentiment (Question 29: Average 2.95, N=85). When 
cross-analyzed by CIP practitioner/partner status, jurisdiction type, and federal 
FEMA regions (see Figures 20A–20F in Appendix C), respondents from 
county/parish levels of government disagreed more (almost 80 percent) than 
those respondents from local (city/town/village/municipal) and state levels of 
government who both disagreed almost 60 percent of the time. Respondents 
from federal FEMA Regions 4, 5, and 7 almost entirely disagreed. The data 
indicates a clear lack of dedicated CIP organizations at the state and local levels. 
This becomes important in the context of the numerous and varied expectations 
placed upon the community. 
This data was inversely supported by data in Figure 21. Respondents 
were asked to indicate if they felt the CIP program in their jurisdiction was 
managed as a collateral responsibility by an organizational component whose 
core mission was not critical infrastructure protection (Question 30: Average 
3.93, N=84). Respondents generally agreed that this was the case. When cross-
analyzed by CIP practitioner/partner status, jurisdiction type, and federal FEMA 
regions, respondents from FEMA Regions 1, 2, and 8 disagreed the most, and 
respondents from Region 7 agreed 100 percent of the time. 
37 
 
Figure 20.  Respondents’ perception that their jurisdiction’s CIP program 
is managed by an organizational component entirely dedicated 
to CIP (security and resilience) as its core mission. 
 
Figure 21.  Respondents’ perception that their jurisdiction’s CIP program 
is managed as a collateral responsibility by an organizational 
component whose core mission is not CIP (security and 
resilience). 
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CIP organizations with more robust organizational or programmatic 
staffing do exist, but they appear to be more the exception than the standard. 
When asked whether the CIP program or organization in their jurisdiction was 
adequately staffed, most respondents answered overwhelmingly negative 
(Question 25: Average 2.62, N=86) that their CIP program or organization was 
adequately staffed, though a pocket of positive respondents did exist (see Figure 
22). Cross analysis of response data (see Figures 22A–22H in Appendix C) by 
CIP practitioner/partner status, jurisdiction type, and federal FEMA regions 
showed no remarkable inconsistencies. Respondents from federal FEMA 
Regions 6 and 7 disagreed 100 percent of the time. Given the clear expectation 
among many for this professional community to coordinate and share information 
with public safety professionals as well as asset owners and operators in their 
jurisdiction,58 perhaps the indication of inadequate staffing should be expected.  
 
Figure 22.  Respondents’ perception that the CIP program/organization 
their jurisdiction is adequately staffed. 
																																																								
58 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7; White 
House, The National Strategy for The Physical Protection, x.  
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Of note, the view of inadequate staffing appears also to transcend a 
respondent’s years of experience as either a CIP practitioner or partner. 
Respondents across all experience ranges indicated a 70 percent to 80 percent 
disagreement when asked if their CIP program or organization was adequately 
staffed (see Figures 23 and 24). Whether reality or perception that CIP programs 
are understaffed, the issue warrants further research or more in depth 
exploration and analysis. If left unchecked, the views may lead to a breakdown of 
program efficacy or morale. 
 




Figure 24.  Composite percentages of Figure 23.  
This real or perceived need for additional staff was also clearly reinforced 
by many respondents in the open narrative question at the end of the survey. 
With a word cloud, Figure 25 visually depicts the narrative provided by 
respondents in Question 48, in which respondents were asked to provide one 
thing that could be done in their jurisdiction to improve their CIP program (the 
word size illustrates the word weight by frequency). Just over one-third of the 52 
respondents to this question, 18 of 52 respondents (34.61 percent) specifically 
cited the need for more and/or dedicated CIP program staff.  
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Figure 25.  Table 1, Question 48 narrative response word cloud (N=52).  
As illustrated by Figure 26, most respondents indicated that the CIP 
program staff in their jurisdiction had a very strong productive working 
relationship with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security protective security 
advisor (PSA) assigned to their jurisdiction (Question 14: Average 4.93, N=91). In 
addition, 79 of 91 respondents (86.81 percent) indicated a positive feeling of their 
jurisdictions working relationship. Notably, almost half of all respondents to this 
question (45 of 91 respondents (49.45 percent)) strongly agreed that their 
jurisdiction maintained a productive working relationship with the PSA assigned 
to their jurisdiction. This feeling appears to be generally universal when cross-
analyzed against supporting data (see Figures 26A–26F in Appendix C) of CIP 
practitioner/partner status, jurisdiction type, and federal FEMA region. This very 
strong productive working relationship is a very positive reflection of the PSA 
program and certainly indicates great collaboration and partnership between 
professionals across the levels of government. It could also indicate a level of 
underlying programmatic dependence on the federal government and the PSA 
program to deliver local CIP programs. If this dependence exists and if it is 
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functional, there is nothing inherently wrong with programmatic dependence. 
However, the existence or level of programmatic dependence on the PSA 
program by more local jurisdictions should be better understood by policy makers 
before future modifications or reductions are made to the PSA program. 
 
Figure 26.  Respondents’ perspective that CIP program staff in their 
jurisdiction maintains a productive working relationship with 
the DHS protective security advisor assigned to their 
jurisdiction. 
Figures 27 and 28 show that most respondents were generally neutral 
(Question 38: Average 3.61, N=83 and Question 39: Average 3.59, N=82) about 
whether the CIP mission and organization in their jurisdiction was well 
understood by stakeholders. This neutrality appears consistent when responses 
are cross-analyzed against CIP practitioner/partner status, jurisdiction type, and 
federal FEMA region (see Figures 27A–27F and 28A–28F in Appendix C). This 
perhaps is in part or in full why local leaders have not invested more directly in 
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their CIP programs or organizations—perhaps the real or perceived need to do 
so is not clear and/or well understood.  
The neutral view of respondents indicating a lack of mission and 
organizational clarity by stakeholders may indicate a lack of clear role or 
mandate or the ability to communicate effectively the role or mandate. The lack 
of stronger understanding by stakeholders could hinder cooperation or retard 
coordination amongst partners.  
 
Figure 27.  Respondents’ perspective on whether the CIP mission in their 
jurisdiction is well understood by stakeholders. 
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Figure 28.  Respondents’ perspective on whether the CIP organization in 
their jurisdiction is well understood by stakeholders. 
As further demonstrated by Figures 29–31, most respondents were 
generally neutral to negative (Question 43: Average 3.12, N=83; Question 44: 
Average 3.55, N=83; and Question 45: Average 3.64, N=83) about whether the 
CIP mission was fully implemented, implemented well and well managed in their 
jurisdiction. These responses may indicate respondents’ tactical lack of 
understanding of their jurisdiction’s CIP mission or awareness of programmatic 
development and implementation. It could also indicate a tactical lack of 
programmatic or organizational maturity in the jurisdiction. This issue also 
warrants additional research, exploration, and analysis. 
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Figure 29.  Respondents’ perspective on whether the CIP mission in their 
jurisdiction has been fully implemented. 
The expressed lack of mission and organizational clarity noted earlier may 
also be impeding mission implementation or fostering a clear and generally 
neutral perception regarding CIP mission implementation. Figure 30 specifically 
and clearly indicates this neutral sentiment of respondents. (Question 44: 
Average 3.55, N=83).  
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Figure 30.  Respondents’ perspective on whether the CIP mission in their 
jurisdiction has been implemented well. 
 
Figure 31.  Respondents’ perspective on whether the CIP mission in their 
jurisdiction is well managed. 
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On the whole, the neutral to negative views expressed by respondents on 
whether the CIP mission in their jurisdiction is fully implemented, implemented 
well, and managed well could provide a real or perceived obstacle to future 
programmatic maturity. Respondents appear to be generally torn or neutral on 
several fronts. Notably, in Figure 32, respondents were divided on whether their 
chief executives or governing bodies have enacted effective CIP related 
executive orders and legislation related to CIP and/or CIP program authorities or 
requirements (Question 11: Average 3.62, N=91). Additionally, 38 of 91 
respondents (41.76 percent) indicated some level of disagreement to this 
question, while 53 of 91 respondents (58.24 percent) indicated a level of 
agreement. Strongly disagree and strongly agree both had the fewest number of 
respondents (nine each). Cross-analysis by qualified jurisdiction demonstrated 
generally consistent answers with the exception of rural respondents that 
indicated 100 percent disagreement; it should be noted that the fewest 
respondents were from rural jurisdictions. 
 
Figure 32.  Respondents’ perspective on whether their chief executive or 
governing body has issued executive orders or enacted 
legislation regarding CIP and/or related program authorities / 
requirements 
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Figures 33 and 34 appear to indicate that respondents feel equally torn or 
neutral on basic program management functions such as whether effective 
performance measures (Question 15: Average 3.52, N=91) and well-defined 
programmatic goals, objectives, and related business process exist in their 
jurisdictions (Question 40: Average 3.57, N=82). Cross-analysis of these 
responses against qualified jurisdictions and jurisdiction type were generally 
consistent and showed one note of interest. Figures 35 and 36 indicate 
respondents from rural and rural-suburban jurisdictions disagreed the most at a 
rate of 50 percent and 70 percent respectively. Of interest, when given the risk as 
they know it or understand it in their jurisdiction, Figure 37 indicates that 
respondents perceptions were also torn or neutral on whether every reasonable 
measure had been taken to assure critical infrastructure is well protected 
(Question 46: Average 3.47, N=83). Cross-analysis of supporting data by 
organization type, qualified jurisdiction, and jurisdiction type (see Figures 37A–
37F in Appendix C) showed response variation by the respondents organization 







Figure 33.  Respondents’ perspective on whether their jurisdiction uses a 
method for measuring the effectiveness of their CIP program. 
 
Figure 34.  Respondents’ perspective on whether the CIP program in their 
jurisdiction maintains mature and well-defined programmatic 
goals, objectives, and related business process.  
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Figure 35.  Figure 34 Cross-analyzed by respondents qualified 
jurisdiction. 
 
Figure 36.  Composite percentages of Figure 35.  
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Figure 37.  Given the known or understood jurisdictional risk, 
respondents’ perspective on whether every reasonable 
measure has been taken to assure critical infrastructure in 
their jurisdiction is well protected.  
Also of note as illustrated by Figure 38 (Question 13: N=91), respondents 
indicated that almost two-thirds (64.83 percent) of jurisdictions maintain a CIP all-
hazard strategic plan, and just under one-third (28.57 percent) of jurisdictions do 
not appear to have a recognized strategic plan in place. Respondents’ data 
indicates that the northeast (FEMA Regions 1 and 2) appears to have the 
greatest number of strategic plans in place (see Figures 38C and 38D in 
Appendix C).  
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Figure 38.  Respondents understanding or view on whether their 
jurisdiction maintains a CIP all hazard strategic plan. 
Despite the potential lack of tactical program understanding or maturity, as 
shown by Figures 39 and 40, strategically, most respondents (68 of 90 
respondents (75.56 percent) and 81 of 91 respondents (89.01 percent) 
respectively) indicated positively that CIP has become (Question 9: Average 
4.18, N=90) or should become and be maintained as a discrete professional 
discipline (Question 10: Average 4.91, N=91). Conversely and respectively, 22 of 
90 respondents (24.44 percent) and 10 of 91 respondents (10.99 percent) 
expressed negative sentiment that CIP has become or should become or be 
maintained a professional discipline. Cross-analysis of support data (see Figures 
39A–39H in Appendix C) by CIP practitioner/partner status, organization type, 
jurisdiction type, and federal FEMA region generally supported this thinking with 
some variations indicated.  
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Figure 39.  Respondents’ perspective on whether the function of 
protecting critical infrastructure against all hazards has 
become a professional discipline. 
 
Figure 40.  Respondents’ perspective on whether the function of 
protecting critical infrastructure against all hazards should 
become or be maintained as a professional discipline.  
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As indicated by Figure 41, most respondents (87 of 90 respondents (96.66 
percent)) also clearly felt that their jurisdictions do strategically recognize and 
utilize concepts outlined in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Question 
12: Average 4.92, N=90). Cross analysis of support data (see Figures 41A–41D 
in Appendix C) by jurisdiction type and federal FEMA region reinforced broad 
support of the NIPP. It should be noted that very small pockets of disagreement 
in FEMA Regions 5 and 6 and among state respondents was seen. 
 
Figure 41.  Respondents’ perspective on whether the CIP organization in 
their jurisdiction utilizes the concepts outlined in the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan.  
A large majority of respondents (77 of 86 respondents (89.53 percent)), as 
illustrated in Figure 42, indicated positive feeling that the CIP/risk management 
mission should be more closely aligned to the mitigation and preparedness 
mission space of emergency management (Question 20: Average 4.69, N=86). 
As further illustrated in Figure 42, some respondents (nine of 86 respondents 
(10.46 percent)) indicated negative feeling to this closer mission space 
alignment. Cross-analysis of support data by CIP practitioner/partner status, 
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organization type, jurisdiction type, and federal FEMA regions (see Figures 43–
46 below and Figures 42A and 42B in Appendix C), specifically Figures 43 and 
44, indicated generally consistent and broad support of a closer mission space 
alignment. As was previously illustrated in Figure 4, approximately one-third (32 
of 91 respondents (35.16 percent)), self-identified their organizations affiliation as 
emergency management. 
 
Figure 42.  Respondents’ perspective on whether the CIP / risk 
management mission should be more closely aligned to the 




Figure 43.  Figure 42 cross-analyzed by respondents federal FEMA 
region. 
 
Figure 44.  Composite percentages of Figure 43G. 
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Figure 45.  Figure 42 cross-analyzed by respondents federal FEMA 
region.  
 
Figure 46.  Composite percentages of Figure 45.  
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This perhaps indicates a programmatic gap between the mitigation and 
protection mission spaces. As indicated by the survey response data, the broad 
recognition and utilization of national doctrine with the real or perceived need for 
additional programmatic and organizational resources could be described as the 
makings of a “national doctrine echo chamber”—a condition wherein national 
thinking and operational posture has outpaced the development of the same 
thinking and operational posture at the state or local government level. In the 
context of state sovereignty and national supremacy, the strategic thinking and 
national doctrine exists, but the consistent and mature tactical organizations and 
programmatic resources within SLTT governments to adequately and/or evenly 
implement the national doctrine does not. This could also indicate that currently 
there is a strategic or tactical level programmatic “tragedy of the commons,” or it 
may be emerging. In this condition, no one beyond an asset owner/operator has 
a clear and consistent feeling of ownership of the protection mission space. 
Therefore, significant tactical investment has not been made to develop and/or 
sustain this program mission space and, by extension, not maturing CIP as a 
discrete professional discipline. This was identified by some respondents in the 
open narrative question at the end of the survey, Table 1: Question 48 (N=52) 
where respondents were asked to provide one insight, effort, initiative, or idea to 
improve their CIP program. Of the 52 respondents to this question, six 
respondents (11.53 percent) proactively and specifically cited the need for more 
executive will and/or a stronger mandate from their executive leadership. 
D. SURVEY SECTION: PERCEPTIONS AND VIEWS OF OPERATIONAL 
BUSINESS PROCESS 
This block of questions centered on the respondents’ general perceptions 
and views of the operational aspects of the critical infrastructure protection 
(security and resilience) enterprise. From an operational perspective, Figure 47 
indicates that respondents felt very positive that their jurisdictions employed a 
method to identify critical infrastructure at risk (Question 33: Average 4.39, N=83) 
and also felt operationally very positive (Figure 48) that their jurisdiction 
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conducted sector and/or site-specific risk assessments that include threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence components (Question 34: Average 4.45, N=83). 
Cross-analysis of supporting data by jurisdiction type and federal FEMA region 
(see Figures 47A–47D in Appendix C) indicates generally consistent responses. 
Respondents were generally more positive than negative (as indicated in Figure 
41) that their CIP staff members are appropriately trained (Question 26: Average 
4.05, N=85). Additionally, as shown in Figure 50, respondents were generally 
more positive than negative that their CIP program maintained sector 
relationships through established liaisons/relationship managers (Question 31: 
Average 4.25, N=84). Finally, as illustrated in Figure 51, respondents were 
generally more positive than negative that their CIP program maintained sector 
relationships with sector working groups or coordinating councils (Question 35: 
Average 4.28, N=82).  
The response data in Figure 51 was inversely supported by the response 
data represented in Figure 52 (Question 36: N=80), where respondents were 
asked to indicate more objectively with only “yes,” “no,” or “I don’t know” 
response options whether their jurisdiction maintained an engagement model 
with infrastructure owners and operators different from sector working groups or 
coordinating councils. As indicated in Figure 52, 47 respondents (58.75 percent) 
answered “no.” Of note, 15 respondents (18.75 percent) indicated, “I don’t know.” 
Respondents indicated at least occasional (to frequent) meetings between their 
jurisdiction’s CIP program and infrastructure owners and operators (Question 37: 
Average 4.14, N=81). Cross-analysis by jurisdiction type showed generally 
consistent responses, and there is some variation among the federal FEMA 
regions. Cross-analysis of supporting data (Figures 47–51) paints a generally 
positive operational picture. 
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Figure 47.  Respondents’ perception on whether the CIP program in their 
jurisdiction employs a method to identify critical infrastructure 
assets, systems and/or networks that may be at risk. 
 
Figure 48.  Respondents’ perspective on whether the CIP program in their 
jurisdiction conducts sector or site specific risk assessments.  
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Figure 49.  Respondents’ perspective on whether staff assigned to CIP 
responsibilities in their jurisdiction are appropriately trained. 
 
Figure 50.  Respondents’ perspective on whether the CIP program in their 
jurisdiction maintains designated liaisons / relationship 
managers / coordinators to work with critical infrastructure 
owners / operators. 
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Figure 51.  Respondents’ perspective on whether the CIP program in their 
jurisdiction maintains sector relationships through established 
sector working groups or coordinating councils. 
 
Figure 52.  Respondents’ knowledge on whether an infrastructure owner 
and operators engagement model different from sector 
working groups or sector coordinating councils is maintained 
in their jurisdiction.  
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Figure 53 indicates that almost all respondents (88 of 91 respondents 
(96.70 percent)) agreed, and over half of all respondents (56 of 91 (61.53 
percent)) strongly agreed that there are many infrastructure assets, facilities, 
systems, and/or networks in their jurisdiction that requires all-hazard protection 
(security and resilience) (Question 16: Average 5.46, N=91). Cross analysis of 
support data (see Figures 53A–53J in Appendix C) by CIP practitioner/partner 
status, organization type, years of experience, jurisdiction type, and federal 
FEMA regions indicates that this thinking appears to transcend all disciplines, 
years of experience, level of government, and federal FEMA regions across the 
nation.  
 
Figure 53.  Respondents’ perspective on whether there are many 
infrastructure assets in their jurisdiction that require all hazard 
protection. 
When asked how much of the critical infrastructure in their jurisdiction is 
publicly owned or operated, respondent estimates (shown in Figure 54) generally 
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ranged evenly and the average of response given was 43 percent (Question 18: 
Average 43%, N=85). However, as depicted in Figure 54, a data cluster in the 15 
to 25 percent estimate range was very distinct. Interestingly, these respondent 
estimates appear to roughly and inversely correlate to the widely known 85 
percent statistic that is often cited as the percentage of critical infrastructure 
owned or operated by the private sector. Furthermore, as indicated in Figure 55, 
most respondents in this cluster indicated one to 10 years of experience as a CIP 
practitioner or partner—since the contemporary framing of CIP in 2001. It should 
be noted, that no literature was found during the literature review process that 
supported or substantiated the 85 percent statistic in any way.  
 
Figure 54.  Respondents’ estimate of the percentage of critical 




Figure 55.  Respondents’ estimate of the percentage of critical 
infrastructure in their jurisdiction that are publicly owned or 
operated cross-analyzed by years of experience. 
Respondents also generally indicated positively that information sharing in 
both directions (Figures 56 and 57) between their CIP program and infrastructure 
owners and operators was occurring (Question 41: Average 4.37, N=82 and 
Question 42: Average 4.09, N=82). Respondents appear to generally feel that 
there is slightly more information being shared by CIP jurisdictional programs 
than the infrastructure owners and operators in their jurisdiction. Cross-analysis 
of support data (see Figures 56A–56F and Figures 57A–57F in Appendix C) by 
CIP practitioner/partner status, organization type, and jurisdiction type appear to 
be generally consistent in their responses. CIP partners tended to disagree at a 
notably higher rate of 30 percent (versus 15 percent for CIP practitioners) and 45 
percent (versus almost 20 percent for CIP practitioners) respectively. 
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Figure 56.  Respondents’ perspective on whether the CIP program in their 
jurisdiction shares information with infrastructure owners and 
operators. 
 
Figure 57.  Respondents’ perspective on whether infrastructure owners 
and operators in their jurisdiction share information with the 
CIP program. 
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As indicated by Figure 58, respondents solidly indicated a neutral to 
positive expression that their jurisdiction had shifted focus from critical 
infrastructure “protection” or “security” also including critical infrastructure 
“resilience” (Question 47: Average 4.00, N=81). It should be noted that almost 
half (43.20 percent) of respondents somewhat agreed that this shift has 
occurred. As further indicated by Figure 59, FEMA Region 4 had the highest rate 
of disagreement and Regions 8, 10, and 6 had the sharpest divide on 
respondents thinking. 
 
Figure 58.  Respondents’ perspective on whether their jurisdiction has 
shifted focus from critical infrastructure “protection” or 
“security” to also including “resilience.” 
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Figure 59.  Respondents’ perspective on whether their jurisdiction has 
shifted focus from critical infrastructure “protection” or 
“security” to also include “resilience” cross-analyzed by FEMA 
region. 
E. SURVEY SECTION: RECOMMENDATIONS 
The last question of the survey was an open-ended narrative opportunity 
for respondents to provide their views or judgment on what could be done in their 
jurisdiction to improve the critical infrastructure protection (security and 
resilience) program. Specifically, respondents were asked to provide one thing 
that could be done in their jurisdiction to improve their CIP program. A total of 52 
respondents provided their views; many respondents provided more than one 
thing that could be done to improve their jurisdiction’s program. Of interest, most 
of the respondent’s suggested program enhancements centered on the five 
common themes. These themes were the need for additional or dedicated 
staffing; improved interaction, coordination, and information sharing with owners 
and operators, jurisdictional stakeholders and across the enterprise; additional or 
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dedicated program funding; the need for additional program resources or 
capability (not specifically citing staffing or funding); and the need for more 
executive will and/or a stronger mandate from their executive leadership.  
The need for additional and/or dedicated CIP program funding was 
reinforced by many respondents in the open narrative question at the end of the 
survey. As indicated in Table 1, approximately one-third of respondents (16 of 52 
respondents (30.77 percent)) identified the specific need for dedicated or 
additional staffing to create or increase program capacity (Question 48: N=52). 
Several respondents (12 of 52 respondents (23.08 percent)) suggested that 
improved interaction, information sharing, and coordination with asset owners or 
operators, jurisdictional stakeholders, and across the CIP enterprise was needed. 
Almost as many respondents (11 of the 52 respondents (21.15 percent)) 
specifically cited the need for more and/or dedicated CIP program funding. 
Beyond the call for additional or dedicated staffing and funding, the need for 
additional or dedicated program resources to create or expand program 
capability was also identified as a respondent theme. Eight of the 52 respondents 
(15.38 percent) identified the generic need for dedicated “resources” to expand 
or create a jurisdictional program, and some respondents included specific 
resource needs such as cyber, forecasting, planning, training, and assessments. 
Six of the 52 respondents (11.53 percent) proactively and specifically cited the 
need for more executive will and/or a stronger mandate from their executive 
leadership in order to enhance their jurisdiction’s program. Specifically noted by 
two respondents of the 52 respondents (3.85 percent), was the call to expand the 
DHS protective security advisor (PSA) and the cyber security advisor (CSA) 
programs as well as a need for a more integrated working relationship with the 
PSA assigned to their jurisdiction. One respondent suggested the need for public 
partners to integrate private partners and their representative associations into 
government response and recovery operations. Another respondent suggested 
that public CIP partners need to step aside and allow “private industry [to] take 
care of their own assets, [in the end] it will be more effective, cheaper, and 
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SAFER!” Table 1 includes all responses to Question 48 exactly as they were 
submitted.  
Table 1.   Question 48 Responses: “If there was one thing that could be 
done in your jurisdiction to improve the CIP program, what 















































































































V. SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
The survey conducted for this thesis captured a lot of rich data and 
respondent perspective on the current state of the critical infrastructure protection 
(security and resilience) mission space within SLTT jurisdictions. Some of the 
key findings identified in this data are summarized here (Table 2). Strategically, 
most respondents clearly felt that their jurisdictions do recognize and utilize the 
concepts outlined in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Question 12: 
Average 4.92, N=90). Furthermore, most respondents also indicated positively 
that CIP has become or should become and be maintained as a discrete 
professional discipline (Question 9: Average 4.18, N=90 and Question 10: 
Average 4.91, N=91). 
Table 2.   Summary of key findings  
There is a lack of dedicated and consistent CIP (security and resilience) 
program funding. 
There is a lack of dedicated and mature tactical CIP (security and resilience) 
organizations at or within the SLTT levels of government. 
There is a lack of dedicated and consistent CIP (security and resilience) 
program staffing. 
There is significant variation in the consistency and local adaptation with which 
the CIP (security and resilience) mission is interpreted, understood, applied 
and implemented across the nation. 
 
As indicated in Figure 9, many respondents indicated that their 
jurisdictions have invested their own operational funds to support the staffing of 
their critical infrastructure protection program (37.5 percent of program staff 
salary is supported by operational budgets). As further indicated in Figure 9, it 
also appears that the financial investments in CIP staff are significantly 
dependent on federal grant funds (55.8 percent of program staff salary is 
supported by federal financial grants).  
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The three most common types of federal grant funds invested in program 
staffing were the HSGP, UASI, and EMPG. Of note, the utilization percentages of 
the funding sources indicated (Figures 9–11) do not change significantly when 
filtered by 80 percent plus utilization of a single funding source indicating a 
dependence on these federal funding mechanisms. The utilization of federal 
grant funds increases when cross-analyzed against CIP staff members where 
staff members are not fully dedicated to CIP program responsibilities. Figure 12 
indicates a 65.6 percent utilization of federal financial grants in this instance. The 
high utilization of federal grant funds to support staff members not fully dedicate 
to CIP responsibilities indicates both a critical dependence on these federal funds 
and inherent programmatic vulnerability. 
Though analysis of respondent data indicates an all inclusive jurisdictional 
average of 4.9 fulltime and 4.3 part-time staff members assigned to CIP 
responsibilities, over half the respondents (59.57 percent) indicated that where 
there is fulltime CIP programmatic staffing within a state or local governmental 
jurisdiction, it appears to be one or two fulltime staff members. When directly 
asked whether the CIP program or organization in their jurisdiction was 
adequately staffed, most respondents were overwhelmingly negative, though 
there was a pocket of positive respondents. Based on respondent data, current 
staffing levels appear to be inadequate (Question 25: Average 2.62, N=86). This 
sentiment was very clearly indicated by the survey response data of multiple 
questions.  
Most respondents did indicate that the CIP program staffs in their 
jurisdiction have a very strong productive working relationship with the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security protective security advisor (PSA) assigned to 
their jurisdiction (Question 14: Average 4.93, N=91). This very strong productive 
working relationship is a very positive reflection of DHS and the PSA program 
and certainly indicates great collaboration between professionals across the 
levels of government; however based on provided staffing levels, this may 
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indicate a level of underlying programmatic dependence on the federal 
government and the PSA program to deliver local CIP programs. 
It appears that the CIP tactical and operational mission and mandate are 
highly adapted locally59 but are not as clearly and/or consistently interpreted, 
applied, implemented (Question 43: Average 3.12, N=83; Question 44: Average 
3.55, N=83; and Question 45: Average 3.64, N=83) or understood (Question 38: 
Average 3.61, N=83 and Question 39: Average 3.59, N=82) within jurisdictions 
across the nation. Operational CIP program responsibilities in state and local 
government appear to be managed as a component function (Question 30: 
Average 3.93, N=84) with generally minimal programmatic staffing. Respondents 
generally disagreed when asked if their jurisdiction’s CIP program was managed 
by an organizational component entirely dedicated to CIP as its core mission 
(Question 29: Average 2.95, N=85). The data indicates a clear lack of dedicated 
CIP organizations at or within the state and local levels. A large majority of 
respondents felt significantly positive that the CIP/risk management mission 
should be more closely aligned to the mitigation and preparedness mission 
space of emergency management offices and agencies (Question 20: Average 
4.69, N=86). 
Most respondents were generally neutral on whether the CIP mission and 
organization in their jurisdiction are well understood by stakeholders (Question 
38: Average 3.61, N=83 and Question 39: Average 3.59, N=82). This neutral 
view of respondents indicating a lack of mission and organizational clarity by 
stakeholders may indicate a lack of clear role or mandate or the ability to 
communicate effectively the role or mandate. The lack of stronger understanding 
by stakeholders may hinder cooperation or retard coordination among partners. 
The expressed lack of mission and organizational clarity noted might also be 
impeding mission implementation or fostering a generally neutral perception 
regarding CIP mission implementation that was clearly seen in the response 
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data. Though the job appears to be getting done operationally, from a tactical 
organizational perspective, most respondents were generally neutral to negative 
about whether the CIP mission was fully implemented, implemented well, and 
well managed (Question 43: Average 3.12, N=83; Question 44: Average 3.55, 
N=83; and Question 45: Average 3.64, N=83) in their jurisdiction. A solid neutral 
to positive respondent expression was noted; respondents’ jurisdictions had 
shifted focus from critical infrastructure “protection” or “security,” also including 
critical infrastructure “resilience” (Question 47: Average 4.00, N=81). 
Overall, the strategic national doctrine, SLTT strategic plans (Question 13: 
N=91), and operational concepts and tools appear to be well recognized and 
utilized. Moreover, there seems to be a reality or perception that the bridging 
tactical component between strategy and operations has not been fully 
developed or realized—a noted lack of consistent, dedicated, and mature tactical 
organizations, business process (including goals and objectives) (Question 15: 
Average 3.52, N=91 and Question 40: Average 3.57, N=82), staff, and sustained 
programmatic resources and funding was a clear theme throughout the analysis 




The key issues identified by this research present a great opportunity to 
improve the ways in which we pursue the national critical infrastructure security 
and resilience mission. Three specific opportunities were identified: (1) sustained 
and dedicated funding; (2) organizational development and alignment; and (3) an 
integrated national approach with regional constructs. 
A. FUNDING 
Access and availability of financial resources is a cornerstone of any 
successful program or endeavor. There are many traditional and innovative ways 
to fund, support, or sustain a local public program or initiative. A few examples 
include local operating budget supported by local taxes, a fee based system, 
financial bonding, individual, or corporate donations. To date and in general 
terms, it appears that the direct investment of SLTT dollars to develop and/or 
sustain SLTT tactical organizations exists but has been modest. SLTT 
investment of federal HSGP funding was noted, as well as several other federal 
grant funding streams that have been congressionally authorized and 
appropriated to provide SLTT organizations funding for specific risk-based 
security efforts. These include the Port Security Grant Program (PSGP),60 the 
Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP), 61  and the Buffer Zone Protection 
Program (BZPP).62  
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Given the modest direct SLTT investment seen to date, the most realistic 
and expedient opportunity to systemically fund SLTT critical infrastructure 
security and resilience tactical organizations, programs, and operations may be 
through additional federal funding. Further availability of this sustained and 
targeted federal funding to SLTT critical infrastructure security and resilience 
organizations may be the most viable approach to ensure the most uniformed 
and even development and implementation of tactical organizations and 
programs across the nation because of the federal government’s ability to craft 
new grant funding availabilities or to reshape the priorities and application of 
existing and currently available grant funds.  
There may be additional opportunities to provide systemic federal financial 
assistance to support SLTT tactical organization, program and operations 
development, implementation, and sustainment. For its part, Congress could 
further appropriate a new definitive programmatic line of funding to support state 
and local government critical infrastructure security and resilience organizations, 
programs, and their associated operational activities. Similar in approach to the 
Emergency Management Grant Program (EMPG),63 which provides support to 
state and local emergency management organizations to create and sustain a 
system of emergency preparedness to protect life and property, Congress could 
create a discrete Critical Infrastructure Resiliency Grant Program (CIRGP) to 
support organizational development, sustain dedicated CIRGP staff, and 
associated programmatic and operational activities. Additionally, Congress has 
directed a 25 percent pass through requirement to law enforcement to support 
terrorism prevention activities known as the Consolidation of Law Enforcement 
Terrorism Prevention Activities (LETPA). 64  The LETPA requirement can be 
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fulfilled with funds from the State Homeland Security Program (HSGP), the 
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), or a combination of both.65 Under this 
already existing pass through requirement, eligible funding activities include 
those outlined in the National Prevention Framework 66  and the National 
Protection Framework.67 Certainly, operations and activities supported under the 
National Prevention Framework enhance the security of our nations critical 
infrastructure; however, it appears this provision is generally under-recognized or 
underutilized as a systemic programmatic funding mechanism to support state 
and local government protection and resilience operations and activities. 
Additional education and awareness (in the form of funding workshops, bulletins 
or otherwise) of these funding provisions within the critical infrastructure security 
and resilience community is recommended. It is possible that the current funding 
requirements in the prevention mission space fully obligates these funds on a 
jurisdictional basis thereby creating contention for these resources.  
Another option is at the policy level, the DHS or FEMA could prioritize this 
funding through grant guidance and requirements. Similar in spirit and intent to 
the congressional LETPA funding mandate, the DHS or FEMA could create a 
discrete protection mission policy mandate whereby a percentage of existing 
HSGP or EMPG funds could be directed to support systemic critical infrastructure 
security and/or resilience activities and the requisite program and organizational 
development as outlined in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and the 
National Protection Framework.68 
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Table 3.   Summary of key findings aligned to recommendations: 
Funding (A). 





There is a lack of dedicated and consistent 
CIP (security and resilience) program funding.	 X 
	 	
There is a lack of dedicated and mature 
tactical CIP (security and resilience) 




There is a lack of dedicated and consistent 
CIP (security and resilience) program staffing.	 X 
	 	
There is significant variation in the 
consistency and local adaptation with which 
the CIP (security and resilience) mission is 
interpreted, understood, applied and 
implemented across the nation.	
	 	 	
 
B. CLOSER ALIGNMENT TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
Based on survey responses, closer and formalized organizational and/or 
programmatic alignment to the mitigation and preparedness mission space of 
emergency management should be explored.  
The Commonwealth of Australia provides a model example of this close 
doctrinal alignment. With the 2009 publication of the Australian CIR strategy, the 
Commonwealth recognized a clear nexus between the resilience of critical 
infrastructure and emergency management. This includes an expanded 
emergency management mandate and portfolio to facilitate greater resiliency. 
This expanded emergency management mission space and portfolio is further 
defined and outlined in Australia’s National Strategy for Disaster Resilience 
(NSDR) as published by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) in 
February 2011.69 The Australian disaster resilience strategy further builds upon 
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the whole-of-nation concept and the notion of shared responsibility in becoming a 
resilient nation. This shared responsibility includes business, community, and 
individuals as the cornerstones. 
Since 2009, the interconnected Australian approach integrating critical 
infrastructure, business, and individual preparedness together is enhanced 
resilience—each with its own responsibility to build a resilient Australia. The 
common thread tying Australian critical infrastructure and emergency 
management together is resiliency. There is recognition in the Australian whole-
of-nation approach that individual people are the individual threads that 
collectively comprise the fabric of a community—as a private resident, an 
employee or business-person—if the individual is more resilient, the community 
is more resilient and by extension the nation is more resilient.  
Domestically, the White House and the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security70 first recognized this subtle shift in thinking from a “protection” to an all-
hazard capabilities based, whole community “resilience” mindset of national 
preparedness with the publication of Presidential Policy Directive 8: National 
Preparedness.71 The subsequent publication of Presidential Policy Directive 21 
(PPD 21)72 and the 2013 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP 2013)73 
further defined the evolution of a strictly “protection” mindset to include “security” 
and “resilience.” Additional definitional outlines are also contained within the 
national mission frameworks. From a doctrinal and organizational perspective, 
the United States appears to generally maintain critical infrastructure protection 
(security and resilience) and emergency management as two discrete (in some 
cases almost mutually exclusive) parallel workflows. Perhaps one of the only 
currently recognized operational touchpoint between critical infrastructure and 
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emergency management enterprises is during the post-event recovery phase 
within which the two must (or should) collaborate to restore impacted 
infrastructure. This organizational separation may be very necessary, 
appropriate, and sustainable within the context of federal and state governments. 
Based on respondent data, it appears that the need or sustainability of discrete 
and/or parallel critical infrastructure and other public safety (i.e., law enforcement 
and emergency management) organizations softens with the more local levels of 
government. Respondent data indicates that local adaptation 74  of blended 
organizations and associated blended responsibilities appears to be currently 
prevalent. 
Extending and applying Egli’s resiliency roots logic, 75  the deeper, 
stronger, and more mature programmatic and organizational roots of the 
emergency management discipline may provide a stronger foundation for critical 
infrastructure protection (security and resilience) activities at more local levels of 
government. Although, in many instances emergency management organizations 
can be understaffed and/or under-resourced—based on respondent data—it 
appears that both critical infrastructure and emergency management partners 
across the state and local governments spectrum would embrace such an 
alignment. The more mature root system of the emergency management 
preparedness and mitigation space could serve critical infrastructure practitioners 
well in two ways.  
First, organizational and/or programmatic alignment of the protection 
mission space with the preparedness and mitigation mission space (and the 
emergency management organization within which it resides) could allow for 
more effective application of the emergency management organizational 
structure and resources to operationally support the protection mission. 
Furthermore, leveraging established emergency management structures could 
allow protection practitioners to collaborate more efficiently across the whole 
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community to support steady-state protection activities. 76  Second, a closer 
alignment of these mission spaces could ensure that CIP (security and 
resilience) resource requirements and gaps are more adequately reflected in the 
Threat Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA),77 as well as each 
states’ state preparedness report (SPR). 78  This requisite planning and 
preparedness, 79  in turn, could make protection resource requirements better 
known and understood, as well as strengthen the alignment between critical 
infrastructure sectors, and the related emergency management emergency 
support function (ESF),80 and recovery support function (RSF) to each. This 
could lead to further programmatic awareness of associated stakeholders, 
increased funding, and accelerated program development. Certainly, this close 
alignment is consistent with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 
2013.81 As indicated by Figure 60, a clear and integrated continuum among the 
national mission areas is contemplated and expected.  
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Figure 60.  Critical infrastructure risk in the context of national 
preparedness82 
Table 4.   Summary of key findings aligned to recommendations: Alignment (B) 





There is a lack of dedicated and consistent 
CIP (security and resilience) program funding.	 X  
	
There is a lack of dedicated and mature 
tactical CIP (security and resilience) 




There is a lack of dedicated and consistent 
CIP (security and resilience) program staffing.	 X X 
	
There is significant variation in the 
consistency and local adaptation with which 
the CIP (security and resilience) mission is 
interpreted, understood, applied and 





82 Ibid., 19. 
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C. HOMELAND SECURITY INDUSTRIAL BASE 
The survey results illustrated significant and rightful variation in the local 
adaptation, clarity and consistency with which the CIP (security and resilience) 
mission is interpreted, understood, applied, or implemented across the nation. 
One opportunity to even these variations would be through the creation of a 
nationally recognized Homeland Security Industrial Base (HSIB). The notion of 
critical modern industrial infrastructure, the beginnings of the modern defense 
industrial base,83 and the need to protect it84 can be traced back to the global 
tension and lead-up to World War I. The United States Industrial Alcohol (USIA) 
company distilled molasses into industrial grade alcohol, which was a key 
component to produce military munitions, including dynamite, smokeless powder, 
and high explosives. 85  In 1915, USIA was one of the largest producers of 
industrial alcohol in the United States and a critical supplier to the then 
Department of War and allied European governments.86 The critical nature of 
USIA’s Boston operation and the need to protect it was illustrated in April of 
1917. In the context of a citywide threat warning issued by Boston’s district 
attorney that bands of violent anarchists were targeting the city. To better protect 
its infrastructure and operations against sabotage, USIA hired guards who were 
sworn-in as special police officers to augment the single Boston police officer 
regularly posted to the USIA Boston operation.87 
The concepts of further refined modern thinking of cornerstone 
infrastructure critical to our national interests dates back to the Defense 
Production Act of 1950 (DPA) that was passed to ensure prompt supply and 
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adequate quantities of needed military and civilian goods.88 As prompted by then 
President Harry S. Truman, the infrastructure outlined in the DPA included 
agriculture, energy (all forms of energy), health, transportation (all forms of civil 
transportation), defense (in the context of water resources), and commerce.89 
President Barack Obama has more recently reinforced the critical nature of these 
same infrastructure sectors in the context of national defense needs. 90  By 
executive order, President Obama has directed federal executive departments 
and agencies not only to support all hazard plan and program development to 
meet military and civilian demand requirements but also to foster cooperation 
and “improve the efficiency and responsiveness of the domestic industrial base 
to support national defense.”91 He outlined the National Security Council, the 
Homeland Security Council, and the National Economic Council as the 
coordinating policy forum for this purpose.92  
Implicit among the named DPA infrastructure is the dependency and 
interdependency that commerce and manufacturing have on what is now thought 
of in the civilian infrastructure protection community as lifeline infrastructure 
sectors. The foundational infrastructure on which all other sectors are dependent 
or lifeline critical infrastructure sectors are defined as the energy, water, 
transportation, communications,93 and financial services94 sectors.  
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The productive and collaborative benefit of regional constructs are 
encouraged by the National Governors’ Association (NGA)95 and have been 
recognized in many instances to include the Urban Areas Security Initiative 
(UASI) program, the UASI National Capitol Region, the New York-New Jersey 
Transportation Operations Coordinating Committee (TRANSCOM), and 
metropolitan planning organizations (MPO) as required under federal 
transportation law. 96  Further expanding upon or leveraging the successful 
transportation MPO model or the nature of the UASI model to include an 
emphasis on the lifeline infrastructure on which it depends should be examined.  
The creation of a Homeland Security Industrial Base (HSIB), initially 
comprised of the defined lifeline infrastructure sectors, could bring a sharper 
programmatic focus to intra- and inter-regional critical infrastructure protection 
and resiliency (CIPR) activities generally and specifically within and among these 
infrastructure sectors and therefore should be explored and considered. In the 
context of the National Protection Framework,97 the concept of a HSIB could be 
integrated with legacy DPA mandates and authorities. In addition, special 
expectations and preferential technical, analytical, contractual, or financial 
consideration could be required and afforded the sectors of a HSIB as they are 
currently under the DPA.98 The integration of a HSIB with DPA mandates and 
authorities could also serve to eliminate or bridge much of the artificial 
distinctions that are currently found between military and civilian doctrine. 
Integrated national doctrine should result in sharpened national programmatic 
focus on a more finite scope of infrastructure sectors, which will allow the CIPR 
mission to be more clearly understood, programmatically consumable, and 
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facilitate a steady-state protection posture.99 It would serve the needs of our 
national defense complex as well as the commercial and economic needs of 
state and local communities and therefore would serve to further strengthen the 
commercial and economic fabric of the nation and remain true to our federalist 
system.  
As a macro analog to the Egli resiliency roots,100 with a sharper focus, the 
analytical, protection, and resilience work necessary within and among each 
sector of the HSIB could be more directly supported and matured. Once 
established in a comprehensive manner, the dependencies and 
interdependencies among and between HSIB sectors could serve as a baseline 
tier (roots) for additional dependency and interdependency analysis and 
resiliency effort with all 16 currently defined NIPP sectors. This, in turn, could 
create higher ordered tiers within the HSIB.  
Tiered implementation of a geographic regional structure101  within the 
HSIB—such as those previously noted or the six U.S. Department of Justice 
Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) geographic regions102 or the 10 
established FEMA (federal) geographic regions103—might further serve to better 
manage security and resilience issues and initiatives and may facilitate a clearer 
understanding of the intra- and inter-regional risk landscape and operating 
environments as contemplated by former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff.104 
Federal resources and programs, such as the federal protective security advisors 
(currently aligned by the established federal regions), the cyber security advisors 
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(CSA), the Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP), 105  and the 
National Infrastructure Simulation and Assessment Center (NISAC), could be 
systematically engaged106 with SLTT practitioners and partners across the HSIB 
tiers and regions. Establishing a HSIB with such a regional construct is 
consistent with the NIPP 2013 core tenets 1–5 (specifically Core Tenet 5).107 
Such a construct may create a clearer regional identity for state and local 
infrastructure practitioners and partners. It may also provide the necessary 
multijurisdictional regional management structure and strategic mission space to 
facilitate and operationally achieve goals, such as the 12 innovative risk 
management and the partnership building calls to action included in the NIPP 
2013108—all of the goals have a multijurisdictional or regional dimension—or the 
forward-looking implementation of the FEMA 2030 vision of Essential 
Capabilities, Innovative Models & Tools and Dynamic Partnerships of crisis and 
disaster response.109 Additionally, this construct could support and integrate with 
existing regional consortia 110  and further institutionalize our largely voluntary 
protection mission space (see Table 5).111 Existing fusion centers within each 
state could further reinforce this thinking as coordinating nodes within a regional 
HSIB construct and could be definitely linked to the National Infrastructure 
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Coordinating Center (NICC) and the National Cybersecurity and Communications 
Integration Center (NCCIC) for this purpose.112 
Table 5.   Summary of key findings aligned to recommendations: HSIB (C) 





There is a lack of dedicated and consistent 
CIP (security and resilience) program funding.	 X   
There is a lack of dedicated and mature 
tactical CIP (security and resilience) 




There is a lack of dedicated and consistent 
CIP (security and resilience) program staffing.	 X X 
	
There is significant variation in the 
consistency and local adaptation with which 
the CIP (security and resilience) mission is 
interpreted, understood, applied and 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Is there a problem here? There appears to be an interesting paradox in 
the respondent data. State and local jurisdictions and the professionals that 
serve them appear to be getting the job done from an operational perspective—
operational tools, as needed operational staffing and tactical organizational 
models do exist. However, respondents report that the development of clear 
management constructs, tactical business processes, and associated tactical 
CIP (security and resilience) organizations to manage those processes and be 
wholly dedicated to support this mission space within state and local jurisdictions 
has been modest. 
The respondent data appears to indicate a lack of available, dedicated, 
and consistently applied CIP (security and resilience) program funding and CIP 
(security and resilience) program staff. The respondent data also appears to 
illustrate that the CIP (security and resilience) mission is highly adapted locally 
and is not clearly and/or consistently interpreted, understood, applied, or 
implemented across the nation. 
There are several opportunities to strengthen the systemic support 
structure and foster consistent maturing of tactical CIP (security and resilience) 
organizations nationally. Further availability of sustained and targeted federal 
funding to SLTT critical infrastructure security and resilience organizations may 
be the most viable national approach to ensure the most uniformed and even 
development and implementation of tactical organizations and programs across 
the nation because of the federal government’s ability to craft new grant funding 
availabilities or to reshape the priorities and application of existing and currently 
available grant funds.  
Additionally, based on survey responses, closer and formalized 
organizational and/or programmatic alignment within SLTT jurisdictions of the 
CIP/risk management mission to the mitigation and preparedness mission space 
92 
of emergency management should be explored. From a doctrinal and 
organizational perspective, the United States appears to generally maintain 
critical infrastructure protection (security and resilience) and emergency 
management as two discrete (in some cases almost mutually exclusive) parallel 
workflows. This organizational separation may be very necessary, appropriate, 
and sustainable within the context of federal and state governments. Based on 
respondent data, it appears that the need or sustainability of discrete and/or 
parallel critical infrastructure protection (security and resilience) and other public 
safety (i.e., law enforcement and emergency management) organizations softens 
with the more local levels of government. Respondent data indicates that local 
adaptation113 of blended organizations and associated blended responsibilities 
appears to be currently prevalent. Although in many instances emergency 
management organizations can be understaffed and/or under-resourced—based 
on respondent data—it appears that both critical infrastructure protection 
(security and resilience) and emergency management partners across the state 
and local government spectrum would embrace such an alignment. The more 
mature root system of the emergency management preparedness and mitigation 
space could serve critical infrastructure protection (security and resilience) 
practitioners well. 
The creation of a Homeland Security Industrial Base (HSIB), initially 
comprised of the defined lifeline infrastructure sectors, could bring a sharper 
programmatic focus to intra- and inter-regional critical infrastructure protection 
and resiliency (CIPR) activities generally and specifically within and among these 
infrastructure sectors and therefore should be explored and considered. The 
integration of a HSIB with DPA mandates and authorities could also serve to 
eliminate or bridge much of the artificial distinctions that currently exist between 
military and civilian doctrine. Integrated national doctrine should result in 
sharpened national programmatic focus on a more finite scope of “critical” 
infrastructure sectors, which will allow the multi-jurisdictional CIPR mission to be 
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more clearly interpreted, understood, programmatically consumable and facilitate 
a steady-state protection and resilience posture.114  
Tiered implementation of a geographic regional structure115  within the 
HSIB might further serve to better manage security and resilience issues, 
initiatives, and programs and may facilitate a clearer multijurisdictional 
understanding of the intra- and inter-regional risk landscape and operating 
environments.116 Federal resources and programs (civilian and military), could be 
systematically engaged117 with SLTT practitioners and partners across the HSIB 
tiers and regions. Moreover, the Homeland Security Industrial Base could serve 
the needs of our national defense complex as well as the commercial and 
economic needs of state and local communities; therefore, it would serve to 
further strengthen the commercial and economic fabric of the nation and remain 
true to our federalist system.  
As individual or coupled elements, enhanced funding opportunities, 
strengthened tactical CIP (security and resilience) organizations, and a refined 
strategic regional implementation approach could better support consistent 
programmatic implementation nationally. This could mitigate any conditions of 
national TOC that may potentially exist or emerge and further drive a national 
multidiscipline multijurisdictional culture of steady-state resilience. 
																																																								
114 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Protection Framework, 22.  
115 Hardenbrook, “The Need for a Policy Framework,” 7.  
116 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, i–ii.  
117 Egli, Beyond the Storms, 22, 73, 85.  
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APPENDIX A. THE SURVEY QUESTIONS 
Putting the Critical Back in Critical Infrastructure 
	
The purpose of this survey and its associated research is to study critical 
infrastructure protection activities, in state and local government that illustrate the 
level of programmatic and organizational maturity and establishment. 
You are invited to participate in this research study titled “Putting the Critical 
Back in Critical Infrastructure.” This survey will be conducted via Lime Survey. 
Only answers to survey questions will be collected. No personal identifying data 
will be collected or stored. Survey responses will be presented anonymously to 
the researcher. There is minimal risk that data collected could be mismanaged. 
THANK YOU for your interest and time! 
There are 48 questions in this survey. 
Question One 
You are invited to participate in this research study titled “Putting the Critical 
Back in Critical Infrastructure.” The purpose of the research is to study critical 
infrastructure protection activities in state and local government that illustrate the 
level of programmatic and organizational maturity and establishment. 
This survey will be conducted via Lime Survey. Only answers to survey questions 
will be collected. No personal identifying data will be collected or stored. Survey 
responses will be presented anonymously to the Researcher. There is minimal 
risk that data collected could be mismanaged. 
This survey is expected to take 20–25 minutes to complete. Your participation is 
voluntary. If you participate, you are free to skip any question(s) or stop 
participating at any time without penalty or consequence. The alternative to 
participating is to not participate, which you may choose by clicking the “I do not 
consent to participate in this study” button below. Your responses to the survey 
are anonymous and no personally identifiable information will be collected or 
captured. All survey related material will be kept on a password-protected 
computer, which will be locked in an office or file cabinet. At the conclusion of this 
research, all survey related data will be turned over to the principal investigator 
and kept on a password-protected computer that will be locked in an office. 
The anticipated benefit of this study is to add to the body of research about best 
practices to meet the emerging needs for state and local critical infrastructure 
protection practitioners and organizations and to gain insight into the current 
state of maturity of critical infrastructure protection practices and organizations. 
You may receive a copy of the completed research by contacting the researcher 
at bcmason@nps.edu. Contacting the researcher does not affect the anonymity 
of your participation in the study. 
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If you have questions about this research, contact the Naval Postgraduate 
School principal investigator Rudy Darken at darken@nps.edu. If you have 
questions regarding your rights as a research subject, contact the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Institutional Review Board (IRB) Chair Dr. Larry Shattuck 
at lgshattu@nps.edu or 831 656 2473.  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 I consent to participate in this study.  
 I do not consent to participate in this study.  
Question Two 
I am:  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 a critical infrastructure protection (CIP) practitioner within my jurisdiction.  
 a member of a partner organization to my jurisdiction’s CIP practitioners.  
Question Three 
My primary jurisdiction is or within the state/territory of:  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 
 
• Alabama  
• Alaska  
• American Samoa  
• Arizona  
• Arkansas  
• California  
• Colorado  
• Connecticut  
• Delaware  
• District of Columbia  
• Federated States of 
Micronesia  
• Florida  
• Georgia  
• Guam  
• Hawaii  
• Idaho  
• Illinois  
• Indiana  
• Iowa  
• Kansas  
• Kentucky  
• Louisiana  
• Maine  
• Maryland  
• Massachusetts  
• Michigan  
• Minnesota  
• Mississippi  
• Missouri  
• Montana  
• Nebraska  
• Nevada  
• New Hampshire  
• New Jersey  
• New Mexico  
• New York  
• North Carolina  
• North Dakota  
• Northern Mariana Islands  
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• Ohio  
• Oklahoma  
• Oregon  
• Pennsylvania  
• Puerto Rico  
• Republic of the Marshall 
Islands  
• Rhode Island  
• South Carolina  
• South Dakota  
• Tennessee  
• Texas  
• United States Virgin Islands  
• Utah  
• Vermont  
• Virginia  
• Washington  
• West Virginia  




My organization is best described by one of the following:  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Critical infrastructure protection (CIP)  
 Emergency management  
 Emergency medical services (EMS)  
 Fire / rescue / hazardous materials  
 Homeland security  
 Information technology (IT) / cybersecurity  
 Law enforcement  
 Private sector infrastructure owner / operator  
 Public health  
 Public works  
 Utilities regulator  
 Other—please describe in the narrative box provided  
Make a comment on your choice here: NARRATIVE BOX PROVIDED 
Question Five 
Please choose one of the following that best describes your role within your 
organization:  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Program manager  
 Supervisor / team leader  
 Manager / bureau chief  
 Director / deputy director  
 Elected public official  
 Appointed public official  
 Vice president / managing director / executive manager  
 Other—please describe in the narrative box provided  
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Make a comment on your choice here: NARRATIVE BOX PROVIDED 
Question Six 
Please choose one of the following that best describes how long you have been 
a CIP practitioner or CIP partner:  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 1–5 years  
 6–10 years  
 11–15 years  
 16–20 years  
 more than 20 years  
Question Seven 
My jurisdiction is:  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 City / town / village / municipal  
 County / parish  
 State  
 Territorial  
 Tribal  
 Private sector infrastructure owner / operator  
 Other—please describe in the narrative box provided  
Make a comment on your choice here: NARRATIVE BOX PROVIDED	
Question Eight 
Please choose one of the following that best describes your jurisdiction:  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 Rural  
 Rural—suburban  
 Suburban  
 Suburban—urban  







The function of protecting critical infrastructure (CI) against all hazards in the 
United States has become a professional discipline.  













The function of protecting critical infrastructure against all hazards in the United 
States SHOULD become (or be maintained as) a professional discipline.  













My elected chief executive (e.g., mayor, governor) and/or elected governing body 
(e.g., council, committee, commission, board, legislature) have issued 
EXECUTIVE ORDERS and/or enacted LEGISLATION regarding CIP and/or 
related program authorities / requirements.  













The CIP organization in my jurisdiction utilizes the concepts outlined in the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).  













My jurisdiction maintains a CIP all hazards strategic plan.  
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: PLEASE SELECT ONE 
No Yes I Don't Know
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The CIP organization in my jurisdiction maintains a productive working 
relationship with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) protective 
security advisor (PSA) assigned to my jurisdiction.  













   
 
Question Fifteen 
My jurisdiction uses a method for measuring (e.g., performance measures or 
returns on investment) the effectiveness of the CIP program.  













   
 
Question Sixteen 
There are many infrastructure assets, facilities and/or systems in my jurisdiction 
that require protection against all hazards.  













The CIP program in my jurisdiction is responsible for developing and/or 
implementing risk mitigation strategies for PUBLICLY owned or operated CI in 




Please choose the appropriate response for each item: PLEASE SELECT ONE 






Please estimate the percentage of critical infrastructure that are PUBLICLY 
owned or operated in your jurisdiction.  
Please choose only one of the following:	
• 0%  
• 5%  
• 10%  
• 15%  
• 20%  
• 25%  
• 30%  
• 35%  
• 40%  
• 45%  
• 50%  
• 55%  
• 60%  
• 65%  
• 70%  
• 75%  
• 80%  
• 85%  
• 90%  




My jurisdiction maintains a CIP organizational element (e.g., team, unit, group, 
bureau, division, department) fully dedicated to the mission of protecting critical 
infrastructure in my jurisdiction.  
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: PLEASE SELECT ONE 
No Yes I Don't Know
   
 
Question Twenty 
The CIP / risk management mission should be more closely aligned to the 
mitigation and preparedness mission space of emergency management.  














My organization / jurisdiction maintains FULLTIME staff dedicated to the CIP 
mission.  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 No  
 Yes  
 I Don't Know  
Question Twenty-Two 
Approximately how many FULLTIME staff members are dedicated to the CIP 
mission in your organization / jurisdiction?  
 
Please choose only one of the following:	
• 1  
• 2  
• 3  
• 4  
• 5  
• 6  
• 7  
• 8  
• 9  
• 10  
• 11  
• 12  
• 13  
• 14  
• 15  
• 16  
• 17  
• 18  
• 19  
• 20  
• 21  
• 22  
• 23  
• 24  
• 25 + 
	
Question Twenty-Three 
My organization / jurisdiction maintains PART-TIME staff dedicated to the CIP 
mission.  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 No  
 Yes  




Approximately how many PART-TIME staff members are dedicated to the CIP 
mission in your organization / jurisdiction?  
Please choose only one of the following: 
• 1  
• 2  
• 3  
• 4  
• 5  
• 6  
• 7  
• 8  
• 9  
• 10  
• 11  
• 12  
• 13  
• 14  
• 15  
• 16  
• 17  
• 18  
• 19  
• 20  
• 21  
• 22  
• 23  
• 24  
• 25 + 
 
Question Twenty-Five 
The CIP program / organization in my jurisdiction is adequately staffed.  













   
 
Question Twenty-Six 
The staff members assigned to CIP responsibilities in my jurisdiction are 
appropriately trained.  


















The salaries of staff members assigned to CIP responsibilities in my jurisdiction 
are funded by: (please enter only whole numbers—if you do not know, please 
enter "0" next to "I don't know")  
Please enter your answer(s) here: 
 My jurisdiction’s operational budget (%) 
 The private sector (%) 
 State financial grants (%) 
 Federal financial grants (%) 
 Other (%) 
 I don't know—please enter "0" 
Question Twenty-Eight 
Regarding staff members salaries assigned to CIP responsibilities in your 
jurisdiction that are supported by FEDERAL grant funding, please select all that 
apply and indicate the percentage of financial dependence:(please enter whole 
numbers —if you do not know, please enter a "0" next to "I don't know")  
Please enter your answer(s) here: 
 Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) (%) 
 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) (%) 
 Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) (%) 
 Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) (%) 
 Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) )%) 
 Centers for Disease Control and Preparedness (CDC) (%) 
 Other (%) 
 I don't know—please enter "0" 
	
Question Twenty-Nine 
The CIP program in my jurisdiction is managed by an organizational component 
that is ENTIRELY dedicated to critical infrastructure protection as its core 
mission.  


















The CIP program in my jurisdiction is managed as a COLLATERAL responsibility 
by an organizational component whose core mission is NOT critical infrastructure 
protection.  













   
 
Question Thirty-One 
The CIP program in my jurisdiction maintains designated liaisons / relationship 
managers / coordinators to work with critical infrastructure owners and/or 
operators.  













   
 
Question Thirty-Two 
The CIP program in my jurisdiction utilizes its own criteria to identify assets of 
significance to my jurisdiction.  
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: PLEASE SELECT ONE 




The CIP program in my jurisdiction employs a method to identify critical 
infrastructure assets, systems, and/or networks that may be at risk.  














The CIP program in my jurisdiction conducts sector and/or site specific risk 
assessments that include threat, vulnerability, and consequence.  













The CIP program in my jurisdiction maintains sector relationships through 
established sector working groups or coordinating councils.  













The CIP program in my jurisdiction maintains an engagement model with 
infrastructure owners and operators DIFFERENT from sector working groups or 
coordinating councils. IF YES, please describe in the narrative box provided.  
Please choose only one of the following: 
 No  
 Yes (please describe in narrative box provided)  
 I don't know  
Make a comment on your choice here: NARRATIVE BOX PROVIDED 
 
Question Thirty-Seven 
Please select one of the following that best describes how often the CIP program 
in your jurisdiction meets with infrastructure owners and operators.  
Please choose the appropriate response for each item: PLEASE SELECT ONE 
 Never 
Almost 










The CIP MISSION in my jurisdiction is well understood by stakeholders (e.g., 
private and public sector infrastructure owners/operators, other governmental 
partners).  













The CIP ORGANIZATION in my jurisdiction is well understood by stakeholders 
(private and public sector infrastructure owners/operators as well as other 
governmental partners).  













The CIP program in my jurisdiction maintains mature and well-defined 
programmatic GOALS, OBJECTIVES, and related BUSINESS PROCESSES.  













   
 
Question Forty-One 
The CIP program in my jurisdiction shares information with infrastructure owners 
and operators.  

















Infrastructure owners and operators in my jurisdiction share information with the 
CIP program.  

















The CIP mission has been FULLY IMPLEMENTED in my jurisdiction.  













The CIP mission has been IMPLEMENTED WELL in my jurisdiction.  













The CIP mission is WELL MANAGED in my jurisdiction.  













Given the risk, every reasonable measure has been taken to assure the critical 
infrastructure in my jurisdiction is WELL PROTECTED.  














My jurisdiction has shifted the focus from critical infrastructure “PROTECTION” to 
also include critical infrastructure “RESILIENCY.”  













If there was one thing that could be done in your jurisdiction to improve the CIP 
program, what would that be?  
Please write your answer here: NARRATIVE BOX PROVIDED 
 
THANK YOU ! 
WWW.CHDS.US 
 
Submit your survey. 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
	
 111 




  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 0 
I consent   91 





  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 1 
CIP practitioner  61 





  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided  1 
Alabama    1 
Alaska    0 
American Samoa   0 
Arizona    2 
Arkansas    1 
California    11 
Colorado    3 
Connecticut    1 
Delaware    0 
District of Columbia   3 
Federated States of Micronesia 0 
Florida    12 
Georgia    0 
Guam     0 
Hawaii    0 
Idaho     1 
Illinois     1 
Indiana    1 
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Iowa     0 
Kansas    0 
Kentucky    2 
Louisiana    2 
Maine     1 
Maryland    0 
Massachusetts   0 
Michigan    5 
Minnesota    2 
Mississippi    0 
Missouri    1 
Montana    0 
Nebraska    1 
Nevada    3 
New Hampshire   1 
New Jersey    3 
New Mexico    1 
New York    4 
North Carolina   0 
North Dakota    0 
Northern Mariana Islands  0 
Ohio     2 
Oklahoma    4 
Oregon    1 
Pennsylvania   4 
Puerto Rico    0 
Republic of the Marshall Islands 0 
Rhode Island    0 
South Carolina   0 
South Dakota   1 
Tennessee    0 
Texas     4 
United States Virgin Islands 0 
Utah     0 
Vermont    0 
Virginia    2 
Washington    8 
West Virginia    0 
Wisconsin    1 









  Response      Respondents 
 
No response provided    0 
Critical infrastructure protection (CIP)  8 
  Emergency management    32 
  Emergency medical services   1 
  Fire / rescue / hazardous materials  3 
  Homeland security     15 
Information technology    0 
Law enforcement     16 
Private sector infrastructure owner / operator 1 
Public health      3 
Public works      1 
Utilities regulator     0 




  Response      Respondents 
 
No response provided      0 
Program manager       29 
Supervisor / team leader      9 
Manager / bureau chief      13 
Director / deputy director      15 
Elected public official      0 
Appointed public official      3 
Vice-president / managing director / executive manager 2 




  Response    Respondents 
 
No response provided  1 
1–5 years    32 
6–10 years    31 
11–15 years    16 
16–20 years    0 







  Response      Respondents 
 
No response provided    0 
City / town / village / municipal   22 
County / parish     27 
State       30 
Territorial      0 
Tribal       0 
Private sector infrastructure owner / operator 0 




  Response    Respondents 
 
No response provided  4 
Rural     2 
Rural—suburban   23 
Suburban    4 
Suburban—urban   34 




Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 1 
1  Strongly disagree  3 
2  Disagree   9 
3  Somewhat disagree  10 
4  Somewhat agree  29 
5  Agree    25 




Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 0 
1  Strongly disagree  2 
2  Disagree   2 
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3  Somewhat disagree  6 
4  Somewhat agree  17 
5  Agree    29 






Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 0 
1  Strongly disagree  9 
2  Disagree   18 
3  Somewhat disagree  11 
4  Somewhat agree  23 
5  Agree    21 




Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 1 
1  Strongly disagree  1 
2  Disagree   0 
3  Somewhat disagree  2 
4  Somewhat agree  20 
5  Agree    46 
6  Strongly agree  21 
 
QUESTION 13 
     Number of 
  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 0 
I don't know   6 
No    26 








Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 0 
99  I don't know   4 
1  Strongly disagree  1 
2  Disagree   3 
3  Somewhat disagree  4 
4  Somewhat agree  10 
5  Agree    24 






Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 0 
99  I don't know   5 
1  Strongly disagree  2 
2  Disagree   19 
3  Somewhat disagree  14 
4  Somewhat agree  24 
5  Agree    20 




Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 0 
1  Strongly disagree  0 
2  Disagree   1 
3  Somewhat disagree  2 
4  Somewhat agree  7 
5  Agree    25 







  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 2 
I don't know   8 
No    28 




  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 6 
0%    1 
5%    0 
10%    4 
15%    11 
20%    11 
25%    11 
30%    5 
35%    2 
40%    3 
45%    3 
50%    6 
55%    0 
60%    2 
65%    3 
70%    3 
75%    4 
80%    7 
85%    2 
90%    3 
95%    3 




  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 3 
I don't know   3 
No    45 






Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 5 
1  Strongly disagree  1 
2  Disagree   5 
3  Somewhat disagree  3 
4  Somewhat agree  21 
5  Agree    37 




  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 6 
I don't know   3 
No    35 




Survey logic rule applied—the appearance of Question 22 in the survey was 
predicated on a “Yes” answer in Question 21.  
 
Number of 
  Response   Respondents 
 
1    21 
2    7 
3    2 
4    2 
5    3 
6    3 
7    1 
8    0 
9    0 
10    2 
11    0 
12    0 
13    0 
14    2 
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15    0 
16    0 
17    0 
18    0 
19    0 
20    2 
21    0 
22    0 
23    0 
24    0 




  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 6 
I don't know   7 
No    54 




Survey logic rule applied—the appearance of Question 24 in the survey was 
predicated on a “Yes” answer in Question 23.  
 
Number of 
  Response   Respondents 
 
1    6 
2    4 
3    6 
4    1 
5    4 
6    0 
7    0 
8    0 
9    0 
10    2 
11    0 
12    0 
13    0 
14    0 
15    0 
16    0 
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17    0 
18    0 
19    0 
20    0 
21    0 
22    0 
23    0 
24    0 




Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 5 
99  I don't know   2 
1  Strongly disagree  21 
2  Disagree   21 
3  Somewhat disagree  20 
4  Somewhat agree  9 
5  Agree    12 




Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 6 
1  Strongly disagree  5 
2  Disagree   10 
3  Somewhat disagree  8 
4  Somewhat agree  24 
5  Agree    29 







































0 25 49 49 13 50 51 
5 0 0 0 2 0 0 
10 1 0 0 1 0 0 
15 1 0 0 1 1 0 
20 1 0 1 2 0 0 
25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30 2 0 0 0 0 0 
35 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40 0 1 0 2 0 0 
45 0 0 0 0 0 0 
50 3 0 0 4 0 0 
55 0 0 0 0 0 0 
60 2 0 0 0 0 0 
65 0 0 0 0 0 0 
70 0 0 0 3 0 0 
75 0 0 0 0 0 0 
80 2 0 1 1 0 0 
85 1 0 0 0 0 0 
90 0 1 0 0 0 0 
95 1 0 0 0 0 0 
100 12 0 0 22 0 0 
 




i. One respondent did not fully indicate all sources of funding (i.e., the percent of funding  






































0 26 17 21 34 36 37 37 38 
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 
3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
15 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
20 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
25 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
30 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
34 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
45 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
50 3 5 4 0 0 0 1 0 
55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
66 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
70 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
74 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
75 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
95 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
100 4 9 7 0 0 0 0 0 
 
TOTAL 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 
 
Footnotes: 
i. Two respondents indicated sources of “federal financial grants” funding that did not equal 100 percent. The percentage 
reported under the Question 28 single Federal financial source (i.e., EMPG, HSGP, UASI) was the same percentage 
indicated for “federal financial grants” in Question 27. In this instance the analysis assumed 100 percent under the federal 
financial source reported rather than the percentage provided. 
ii. Four respondents did not fully indicate the source of federal financial grant funding. The percentage of Federal financial 
sources (i.e., EMPG, HSPG, UASI) in Question 28 did not equal 100 percent. In this instance, the analysis assumed all 
unallocated budget to equal 100% was allocated to the “other” funding source. 
iii. One respondent reported that 100 percent of federal financial grants were EMPG funds and an additional 100 percent 
of federal financial grants came from HSGP funds. In this instance, the analysis assumed that only 50 percent came from 








Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 6 
99  I don't know   1 
1  Strongly disagree  17 
2  Disagree   28 
3  Somewhat disagree  8 
4  Somewhat agree  12 
5  Agree    8 





Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 7 
99  I don't know   1 
1  Strongly disagree  7 
2  Disagree   17 
3  Somewhat disagree  6 
4  Somewhat agree  10 
5  Agree    27 





Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 7 
99  I don't know   2 
1  Strongly Disagree  6 
2  Disagree   6 
3  Somewhat disagree  6 
4  Somewhat agree  18 
5  Agree    27 





  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 7 
I don't know   11 
No    28 





Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 8 
1  Strongly disagree  1 
2  Disagree   4 
3  Somewhat disagree  4 
4  Somewhat agree  37 
5  Agree    27 





Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 8 
1  Strongly disagree  2 
2  Disagree   8 
3  Somewhat disagree  6 
4  Somewhat agree  19 
5  Agree    31 














Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 9 
1  Strongly disagree  3 
2  Disagree   7 
3  Somewhat disagree  8 
4  Somewhat agree  23 
5  Agree    28 





  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 11 
I don't know   15 
No    47 





Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 10 
99  I don't know   2 
1  Never    1 
2  Almost never   5 
3  Infrequently   9 
4  Occasionally   33 
5  Frequently   21 











Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 8 
1  Strongly disagree  4 
2  Disagree   8 
3  Somewhat disagree  23 
4  Somewhat agree  32 
5  Agree    13 





Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 9 
1  Strongly disagree  4 
2  Disagree   7 
3  Somewhat disagree  25 
4  Somewhat agree  31 
5  Agree    13 





Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 9 
99  I don't know   3 
1  Strongly disagree  5 
2  Disagree   9 
3  Somewhat disagree  20 
4  Somewhat agree  24 
5  Agree    12 








Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 9 
99  I don't know   2 
1  Strongly disagree  5 
2  Disagree   3 
3  Somewhat disagree  6 
4  Somewhat agree  20 
5  Agree    27 





Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 9 
99  I don't know   2 
1  Strongly disagree  4 
2  Disagree   5 
3  Somewhat disagree  10 
4  Somewhat agree  23 
5  Agree    29 





Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 8 
1  Strongly disagree  9 
2  Disagree   21 
3  Somewhat disagree  20 
4  Somewhat agree  20 
5  Agree    10 







Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 8 
1  Strongly disagree  4 
2  Disagree   18 
3  Somewhat disagree  13 
4  Somewhat agree  32 
5  Agree    8 





Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 8 
1  Strongly disagree  6 
2  Disagree   12 
3  Somewhat disagree  13 
4  Somewhat agree  33 
5  Agree    13 





Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 8 
1  Strongly disagree  5 
2  Disagree   16 
3  Somewhat disagree  18 
4  Somewhat agree  27 
5  Agree    13 









Assigned     Number of 
Value  Response   Respondents 
 
No response provided 10 
1  Strongly disagree  4 
2  Disagree   9 
3  Somewhat disagree  7 
4  Somewhat agree  35 
5  Agree    15 
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APPENDIX C. CROSS-ANALYZED SUPPORT GRAPHS 
   
Figure 11A. CIP staff salary source by federal FEMA region. 
 
Figure 11B. Utilization of federal funds to support CIP staff salary by 
federal FEMA region. 
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Figure 13A. Respondents’ jurisdiction maintains a CIP organizational element 
fully dedicated to the CIP protection mission by practitioner and partner. 
 
Figure 13B. Composite percentages of Figure 13A. 
 133 
  
Figure 13C. Respondents’ jurisdiction maintains a CIP organizational 
element fully dedicated to CIP protection mission by 
jurisdiction. 
 
Figure 13D. Composite percentages of Figure 13C. 
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Figure 13E. Respondents’ jurisdiction maintains a CIP organizational element 
fully dedicated to CIP protection mission by qualified jurisdiction. 
 
Figure 13F. Composite percentages of Figure 13E. 
 135 
  
Figure 20A. Figure 20 cross-analyzed by respondents that self-identify as a CIP 
practitioner or partner.  
 
Figure 20B. Composite percentages of Figure 20A. 
 136 
  
Figure 20C. Figure 20 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type. 
 
Figure 20D. Composite percentages of Figure 20C. 
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Figure 20E. Figure 20 cross-analyzed by respondents federal FEMA 
region.  
 
Figure 20F. Composite percentages of Figure 20F. 
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Figure 21A. Figure 21 cross-analyzed by respondents that self-identify as 
a CIP practitioner or partner.  
 
Figure 21B. Composite percentages of Figure 21A. 
 139 
  
Figure 21C. Figure 21 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type. 
 
Figure 21D. Composite percentages of Figure 21C. 
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Figure 21E. Figure 21 cross-analyzed by respondents federal FEMA 
region.  
 
Figure 21F. Composite percentages of Figure 22A. 
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Figure 22A. Figure 22 cross-analyzed by respondents that self-identify as 
a CIP practitioner or partner.  
 
Figure 22B. Composite percentages of Figure 22A. 
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Figure 22C. Figure 22 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type. 
 
Figure 22D. Composite percentages of Figure 22C. 
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Figure 22E. Figure 22 cross-analyzed by respondents federal FEMA 
region.  
 
Figure 22F. Composite percentages of Figure 22E. 
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Figure 26A. Figure 26 cross-analyzed by respondents that self-identify as 
a CIP practitioner or partner.  
 
Figure 26B. Composite percentages of Figure 26A. 
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Figure 26C. Figure 26 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type. 
 
Figure 26D. Composite percentages of Figure 26C. 
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Figure 26E. Figure 26 cross-analyzed by respondents federal FEMA 
region.  
 
Figure 26F. Composite percentages of Figure 26E. 
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Figure 27A. Figure 27 cross-analyzed by respondents that self-identify as 
a CIP practitioner or partner.  
 
Figure 27B. Composite percentages of Figure 27A. 
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Figure 27C. Figure 27 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type. 
 
Figure 27D. Composite percentages of Figure 27C. 
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Figure 27E. Figure 27 cross-analyzed by respondents federal 
FEMA region. 
 
Figure 27F. Composite percentages of Figure 27E. 
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Figure 28A. Figure 28 cross-analyzed by respondents that self-identify as 
a CIP practitioner or partner. 
 
Figure 28B. Composite percentages of Figure 28A. 
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Figure 28C. Figure 28 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type. 
 
Figure 28D. Composite percentages of Figure 28C. 
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Figure 28E. Figure 28 cross-analyzed by respondents federal FEMA 
region. 
 
Figure 28F. Composite percentages of Figure 28E. 
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Figure 29A. Figure 29 cross-analyzed by respondents organization type. 
 
Figure 29B. Composite percentages of Figure 29A. 
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Figure 29C. Figure 29 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type.  
 
Figure 29D. Composite percentages of Figure 29C. 
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Figure 30A Figure 30 cross-analyzed by respondents organization type. 
 
Figure 30B. Composite percentages of Figure 30A. 
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Figure 30C. Figure 30 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type. 
 
Figure 30D. Composite percentages of Figure 30C. 
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Figure 31A. Figure 31 cross-analyzed by respondents organization type. 
 
Figure 31B. Composite percentages of Figure 31A. 
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Figure 31C. Figure 31 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type. 
 
Figure 31D. Composite percentages of Figure 31C. 
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Figure 32A. Figure 32 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type. 
 
Figure 32B. Composite percentages of Figure 32A. 
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Figure 33A. Figure 33 cross-analyzed by respondents qualified 
jurisdiction.  
 
Figure 33B. Composite percentages of Figure 33A. 
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Figure 33C. Figure 33 cross-analyzed by respondents qualified 
jurisdiction.  
 
Figure 33D. Composite percentages of Figure 33C. 
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Figure 34C. Figure 34 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type. 
 
Figure 34D. Composite percentages of Figure 34C. 
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Figure 37A. Figure 37 cross-analyzed by respondents organization type. 
 
Figure 37B. Composite percentages of Figure 37A. 
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Figure 37C. Figure 37 cross-analyzed by respondents qualified 
jurisdiction. 
 
Figure 37D. Composite percentages of Figure 37C. 
 165 
  
Figure 37E. Figure 37 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type. 
 
Figure 37F. Composite percentages of Figure 37E. 
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Figure 38A. Figure 38 cross-analyzed by respondents that self-identify as 
a CIP practitioner or partner.  
 
Figure 38B. Composite percentages of Figure 38A. 
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Figure 38C. Figure 38 cross-analyzed by respondents federal FEMA 
region.  
 
Figure 38D. Composite percentages of Figure 38C. 
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Figure 39A. Figure 39 cross-analyzed by respondents that self-identify as 
a CIP practitioner or partner. 
 
Figure 39B. Composite percentages of Figure 39A. 
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Figure 39C. Figure 39 cross-analyzed by respondents organization type. 
 
Figure 39D. Composite percentages of Figure 39C. 
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Figure 39E. Figure 39 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type. 
 
Figure 39F. Composite percentages of Figure 39E. 
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Figure 39G. Figure 39 cross-analyzed by respondents federal FEMA 
region.  
 
Figure 39H. Composite percentages of Figure 39G. 
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Figure 40A. Figure 40 cross-analyzed by respondents that self-identify as 
a CIP practitioner or partner.  
 
Figure 40B. Composite percentages of Figure 40A. 
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Figure 40C. Figure 40 cross-analyzed by respondents organization type. 
 
Figure 40D. Composite percentages of Figure 40C. 
 174 
  
Figure 340E. Figure 40 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type. 
 
Figure 40F. Composite percentages of Figure 40E. 
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Figure 40G. Figure 40 cross-analyzed by respondents federal FEMA 
region.  
 
Figure 40H. Composite percentages of Figure 40G. 
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Figure 41A. Figure 41 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type. 
 
Figure 41B. Composite percentages of Figure 41A. 
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Figure 41C. Figure 41 cross-analyzed by respondents federal FEMA 
region.  
 
Figure 41D. Composite percentages of Figure 41C. 
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Figure 42A. Figure 42 cross-analyzed by respondents that self-identify as 
a CIP practitioner or partner.  
 
Figure 42B. Composite percentages of Figure 42A. 
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Figure 42E. Figure 42 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction 
type. 
 
Figure 42F. Composite percentages of Figure 42E. 
 180 
 
Figure 47A. Figure 47 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type.  
 
Figure 47B. Composite percentages of Figure 47A. 
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Figure 47C. Figure 47 cross-analyzed by respondents federal FEMA 
region.  
 
Figure 47D. Composite percentages of Figure 47C. 
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Figure 48A. Figure 48 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type. 
 
Figure 48B. Composite percentages of Figure 48A. 
 183 
  
Figure 48C. Figure 48 cross-analyzed by respondents federal FEMA 
region.  
 
Figure 48D. Composite percentages of Figure 48C. 
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Figure 49A. Figure 49 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type.  
 
Figure 49B. Composite percentages of Figure 49A. 
 185 
  
Figure 49C. Figure 49 cross-analyzed by respondents federal FEMA 
region. 
 
Figure 49D. Composite percentages of Figure 49C. 
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Figure 50A. Figure 50 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type.  
 
Figure 50B. Composite percentages of Figure 50A. 
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Figure 50C. Figure 50 cross-analyzed by respondents federal FEMA 
region. 
 
Figure 50D. Composite percentages of Figure 50C. 
 188 
  
Figure 51A. Figure 51 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type. 
 
Figure 51B. Composite percentages of Figure 51A. 
 189 
  
Figure 51C. Figure 51 cross-analyzed by respondents federal FEMA 
region. 
 
Figure 51D. Composite percentages of Figure 43C. 
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Figure 53A. Figure 53 cross-analyzed by respondents that self-identify 
as a CIP practitioner or partner.  
 
Figure 53B. Composite percentages of Figure 53A. 
 191 
  
Figure 53C. Figure 53 cross-analyzed by respondents organization type. 
 
Figure 53D. Composite percentages of Figure 53C. 
 192 
  
Figure 53E. Figure 53 cross-analyzed by respondents years of 
experience.  
 
Figure 53F. Composite percentages of Figure 53E. 
 193 
  
Figure 53G. Figure 53 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type. 
 
Figure 53H. Composite percentages of Figure 53G. 
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Figure 53I. Figure 53 cross-analyzed by respondents federal FEMA 
region.  
 
Figure 53J. Composite percentages of Figure 53I. 
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Figure 56A. Figure 56 cross-analyzed by respondents that self-identify as 
a CIP practitioner or partner.  
 
Figure 56B. Composite percentages of Figure 56A. 
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Figure 56C. Figure 56 cross-analyzed by respondents organization type. 
 
Figure 56D. Composite percentages of Figure 56C. 
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Figure 56E. Figure 56 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type. 
 
Figure 56F. Composite percentages of Figure 56E. 
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Figure 57A. Figure 57 cross-analyzed by respondents that self-identify as 
a CIP practitioner or partner. 
 
Figure 57B. Composite percentages of Figure 57A. 
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Figure 57C. Figure 57 cross-analyzed by respondents organization type. 
 
Figure 57D. Composite percentages of Figure 57C. 
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Figure 57E. Figure 57 cross-analyzed by respondents jurisdiction type. 
 




APPENDIX D. NARRATIVE RESPONSE TABLES 
 
 
TABLE 6: Question 4—My organization is best described as one of the following: 
NARRATIVE RESPONSES 
Entries appear exactly as submitted by respondents 
 
State of NM Homeland Security and Emergency Management 
Multidisciplinary 
UASI administered by Law Enforcement 
Note: My organization is the Texas Department of Public Safety, which is the lead State 
Law Enforcement Agency for Texas. However, my division within the agency is the 
Texas Joint Crime Information Center (Fusion Center). It should also be noted that my 
position requires more interaction with the Emergency Management Division than other 
functions in the fusion center. 
Public Sector Infrastructure owner / Operator (State Government)  
Community Owned Four Service Utility: Electric, Natural Gas, Water, Wastewater 
State Government—Florida Department of Transportation 
Esf-8 health and medical 
My organization is responsible for the State and UASI Fusion Centers, State Emergency 
management and Homeland Security. 
State Cabinet Secretariat overseeing all public safety state agencies and homeland 
security functions, with the Cabinet Secretary serving as the Homeland Security Advisor. 
National Domestic Preparedness. 
Law Enforcement Officer assigned to the local fusion center CIP unit 
Specifically I focus on Critical Infrastructure Protection  
Homeland Security—Employed by EMA and have a seat in the state EOC, head up the 
CIP effort in the state while working out of the state's designated fusion center. 
The agency has Emergency Management and Homeland Security responsibilities, which 
CIP comes under. 
Emergency Management and Homeland Security 











TABLE 7: Question 5—Please choose one of the following that best describes 
your role within your organization: NARRATIVE RESPONSES 
Entries appear exactly as submitted by respondents 
 
Critical infrastructure coordinator 
Analyst assigned to CIKR 
Analyst 
Strategic Planner and author of the Texas Infrastructure Security and Resiliency Plan. 
































TABLE 8: Question 7—My jurisdiction is: NARRATIVE RESPONSES 

































TABLE 9: Question 36——The CIP program in my jurisdiction maintains an 
engagement model with infrastructure owners and operators DIFFERENT from 
sector working groups or coordinating councils——IF YES, please describe in the 
narrative box provided. NARRATIVE RESPONSES 
Entries appear exactly as submitted by respondents 
 
I have frequent engagement (threat briefings, site assessments) with private sector 
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